EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ratemaking process is complex and interactive, involving groups with different goals, interests and agenda. It also entails addressing a number of objectives, each of which has a distinct effect on the public interest. Different ratemaking options, which over the past few years gas utilities have proposed before their state commissions, also have varying propensities to advance those objectives, with the usual situation where one option would advance some objectives while impeding others. A systematic approach to ratemaking should result in more transparent, effective and consistent decisions. It can help to elevate the scientific aspect of ratemaking by combining objective and subjective information more formally. The public interest stands to benefit from this approach.

In reviewing different ratemaking proposals, state commissions should have access to unbiased information for helping them better understand and evaluate the consequences of a decision. To make an assessment of ratemaking proposals, commissions should follow three steps. First, commissions need to define the public interest by identifying the multiple objectives that comprise the public interest, assigning weights to those objectives and resolving the trade-offs among them. Second, commissions need to understand each ratemaking proposal fully in terms of how it advances or impedes the multiple objectives that comprise the public interest. Third, commissions need to use a logical, transparent decision-making process, such as multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), that selects or modifies ratemaking proposals that come closest to achieving the public interest, as defined by a commission. MCDA can improve regulatory decisions by making more explicit the relationship between different ratemaking mechanisms and the public interest. It allows a state commission to assess proposals systematically, based on both unbiased and subjective information. Under this approach, prior to a utility proposal, a commission would have enunciated its ratemaking principles and objectives in a public proceeding.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements..............................................................................................iii

I. Introduction........................................................................................................1

II. The standard requirements for “just and reasonable” rates
and policy-based objectives................................................................................2

A. Standard requirements................................................................................... 2

B. Policy-based objectives....................................................................................5

III. Ratemaking methods and trade-offs among regulatory objectives.........................8

A. The standard two-part tariff............................................................................8

1. Description of the standard two-part tariff.................................................9

2. Consequences of the two-part tariff..........................................................10

B. New proposed ratemaking practices..............................................................12

1. Motivations..................................................................................................12

2. New ratemaking proposals.........................................................................14

C. Trade-offs among objectives........................................................................18

1. Challenges for state commissions..............................................................18

2. Illustrations of trade-offs among regulatory objectives...........................20

IV. Strategies for assessing ratemaking practices .............................................23

A. Problems with the current decision process for ratemaking........................24

B. Multi-criteria decision analysis..................................................................25

1. Conceptual issues.........................................................................................25

2. Illustration of the MCDA application.........................................................27

3. Alternative strategies or decision rules......................................................34
V. Conclusions .................................................................................................................36

Appendix: Descriptions of different ratemaking practices...............................39
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I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to assist state commissions in assessing the public-interest effects of existing and new ratemaking methods.¹ The paper presents decision-making strategies that state commissions can apply to make this determination when encountering existing and new ratemaking methods proposed by utilities and other parties.

This paper uses a case study of recent ratemaking proposals by natural gas utilities. These utilities have requested their commissions to approve new ratemaking proposals, which in some instances represent significant departures from traditional practices. These new proposals challenge state commissions to make rational, systematic and transparent decisions in an environment where commissions must abide by standard legal requirements in setting rates in addition to accounting for policy-based objectives.

A major conclusion of this paper is that state commissions should articulate their objectives for ratemaking and place weights on those objectives. The merit of a ratemaking method depends upon how well it advances the totality of regulatory objectives compatible with the public interest. In the real world, the practice of ratemaking requires a commission to trade-off multiple objectives, some of which conflict. These objectives and their relative importance also change over time, warranting commissions periodically to revisit their longstanding ratemaking practices.

State commissions can apply different strategies to assess new ratemaking proposals. Decision-making involves choosing the best solution to a problem from among a number of options. A good decision-making process involves identification of the problem, developing and analyzing alternative options, choosing and implementing the best option, and evaluating the decision quality based on the results.

In reviewing different ratemaking proposals, state commissions should have access to unbiased information for helping them better understand and evaluate the consequences of a decision. To make an assessment of ratemaking proposals, commissions should follow three steps. First, commissions need to define the public interest by identifying the multiple objectives that comprise the public interest, assigning weights to those objectives and resolving the trade-offs among them. Second, commissions need to understand each ratemaking proposal fully in terms of how it advances or impedes the multiple objectives that comprise the public interest. Third, commissions need to use a logical, transparent

¹ Ratemaking involves three distinct steps: (1) the determination of a utility’s annual revenue requirements recoverable from customers, (2) the allocation of the total costs to each customer class or services, and (3) the creation of a rate design that will collect those costs.
decision-making process that selects or modifies ratemaking proposals that come closest to achieving the public interest, as defined by a commission.

Rate designs and cost allocations can produce results that conflict with market realities and underlying regulatory objectives. These consequences can undermine the societal benefits of regulation by producing outcomes that lie contrary to the public interest. Both regulators and public utilities recognize the negative outcomes from faulty ratemaking, although they disagree over the definition of “faulty.” A public utility may perceive faulty ratemaking as the cause of revenue insufficiency and excessive risk allocation to company shareholders; regulators, on the other hand, may view faulty ratemaking as the cause of undue price discrimination, unfair risk shifting of certain costs to consumers, and loud complaints from consumers.

In their review of ratemaking proposals, state commissions should assume that regulatory objectives differ from utilities’ objectives. If both public utilities and state commissions have the same objectives and rank them similarly, regulation would have a lesser role in setting rates, as the “invisible hand” of the marketplace could then be trusted more to guide a utility’s actions toward the public good. But, almost always, utilities and commissions not only disagree over which objectives are relevant for ratemaking but also over the relative importance of each one.

II. The standard requirements for “just and reasonable” rates and policy-based objectives

A. Standard requirements

Most state commissions operate under the legislative and judicial mandates that they set “just and reasonable” rates for public utilities. These mandates reflect standard legal requirements imposed by court interpretations of statutes and of the Constitution. Although interpreted differently by regulators, just and reasonable rates typically have the following four features:

1. They reflect the costs of an efficient or prudent utility.

2. They reflect the cost of serving different customer classes and of providing different services and different levels of services.

3. They allow the efficient or prudent utility a reasonable opportunity to earn a return sufficient to attract new capital.
4. They avoid undue discrimination against any customer class (or customers within a class) or service (e.g., rates should not fall below short-run marginal cost).

The first standard requirement of “just and reasonable” rates prevents customers from paying for costs that the utility could have avoided with efficient or prudent management. Regulators attempt to protect customers from excessive utility costs by scrutinizing a utility’s costs in a rate case or by applying an incentive mechanism (with explicit rewards and penalties) that motivates a utility to act efficiently. Ratemaking practices can affect the propensity of a utility to act efficiently. Cost riders, where certain costs do not undergo a thorough review by the commission, may weaken a utility’s incentive to control those costs, all else equal.

The second standard requirement, which involves a cost-of-service study, allocates costs to various customer classes and utility services. The cardinal principle underlying cost allocation is that customers and services should bear those costs that they cause. Although state commissions pay attention to cost-based principles, they often deviate from these principles in setting rates. The reason for considering non-cost factors is that a commission has different public-policy and ratemaking objectives that cause it to depart from cost-based principles. A commission might feel that rates below fully allocated cost to low-

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2 Axiomatically, the prudence test requires only reasonableness under the circumstances at the time that a utility made a decision or undertook an action; the test excludes consideration of later facts.

3 A cost-of-service study can define cost as either embedded cost or marginal cost. Embedded cost represents a cost actually incurred by a utility, sometimes referred to as original cost, historical cost or accounting cost. Marginal cost is a forward-looking cost that accounts for the cost of a utility in providing an additional unit of service. See the Appendix for a more complete definition.

4 This allocation results in the utility earning similar rates of return across customer classes and services.

5 Many commissions consider cost-of-service studies as guides to setting rates, but not the only source of information or guidance. These studies incorporate judgment and apply imprecise data (e.g., load research). In addition, cost-of-service studies tend to equate rates of return across classes of customers, without accounting for differences in the risk to the utility of serving different customer groups. These studies may also conflict with other regulatory objectives and public policy goals.
income households, or subsidies to promote energy efficiency, are compatible with its goal to serve the public interest.

The third standard requirement permits the utility an opportunity to recover the costs (including its cost of debt and equity) contained in the rates approved by the regulator in the last rate case. A regulator generally sets rates so that a utility has an opportunity to earn a fair or reasonable rate of return for shareholders, assuming efficient and economical management; but the regulator does not guarantee that return. A frequent area of contention in rate cases is the interpretation of “opportunity.”

The fourth standard requirement, while allowing some forms of price discrimination, prevents other forms (i.e., undue discrimination) where, for example, prices for some services are set below incremental costs or favorable price treatment to some customers pushes up rates to other customers. Price discrimination is more socially justified when it leads to a net increase in sales and increased welfare for consumers as a whole, but undesirable when most of the economic gains pass to the firm and total sales by the firm drop. State commissions have authorized discriminatory pricing when it serves some public interest, such as economic development and the deterrence of uneconomic bypass.

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6 A utility’s cost of equity corresponds to the more common term “normal profits.” Both terms account for the cost a utility must incur to attract funds from shareholders. When shareholders invest in a utility, their normal return represents an opportunity cost since they forego earning normal returns in other firms by investing in the utility.

7 A dictionary definition of opportunity relates to the term “good chance.” The reader can see readily how different stakeholders can interpret this term to serve their own interest.

8 The economics literature has shown that, where price discrimination increases total sales, it generally improves economic efficiency as well as the economic welfare of consumers as a whole. Otherwise, when total sales do not increase, the outcome is often higher profits for the selling firm but lower overall well-being for consumers. See, for example, W. K. Viscusi et al., *Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 2nd edition* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), Chapter 9.

9 Historically, state commissions have approved a form of discriminatory pricing for some customers of gas utilities, namely, value of service pricing. Value of service pricing means pricing service to different customer groups based on the value each group places on the service. This pricing method is distinguished from “average pricing,” in which customers of a particular grouping pay the same average price for a service regardless of the value it places on that
State commission-enabling statutes often direct commission to establish rates that are “just and reasonable.” State commissions find this phrase difficult to interpret. Many views of “just and reasonable” exist. What is “just and reasonable” to one group, other groups may find otherwise. A common definition of “just and reasonable” relates to the setting of rates for different classes of customers and services based on the embedded cost-of-service (i.e., the costs incurred by a utility in serving different customer groups and in providing specific services). A regulatory definition often applied is that all customers in a homogeneous class should pay the same rate. “Just and reasonable” also typically entails no cross-subsidies in that no rate to any class of customer or service should result in negative earnings for the utility (i.e., rates that do not lie below a utility’s short-run avoided or marginal cost, with negative earnings either absorbed by the utility’s shareholders or compensated by other customers). “Just and reasonable” also applies to the opportunity for a utility to cover its prudent costs, including a rate of return, sufficient but no higher than necessary, to attract prospective investors.

B. Policy-based objectives

A review of state commission decisions in a large number of rate cases over time reveals at least eight policy-based objectives of ratemaking that commissions have exercised over time. These objectives reflect policy judgments made within the legal parameters established by statutory language and court decisions:

1. “Public acceptability” refers to how the consumers, the public and political actors will respond to the new rates resulting from a commission’s decision. Commissions like to avoid negative public reaction to their decisions, as this places them in an unfavorable light and more likely would trigger service. In the mid-1980s several gas utilities turned to value of service pricing, which set rates below embedded costs but no lower than long-run marginal cost, to maintain industrial load that would have otherwise switched to oil. Most often, these rates were set at (or near) competitive prices for alternative fuels to protect utility ratepayers from the effects of “too deep” discounts.

10 In a typical cost-of-service study, the goal is to allocate revenue responsibly such that utility would earn the same rate of return on the share of rate base allocated to each class of customer or service.

11 The term “horizontal fairness” refers to the equal treatment of similar customers -- for example, customers imposing the same cost on a utility should face the same rate. Another notion of fairness, “vertical fairness,” is the unequal treatment of dissimilar customers -- for example, two customers imposing different cost on a utility should face different rates.
legislative intervention. Public acceptability should result in minimal customer complaints, legislative intervention and negative media publicity.

2. “Rate stability and gradualism” means that new rates and the methods used to determine them have some historical coherence. Especially troublesome are new rates that increase unexpectedly and are well above previously rates for particular classes of customers.

3. “Equity or fairness” is an elusive and contentious term that is the subject of heated debate in ratemaking proceedings. This term applies both to the regulatory treatment of different classes of customers, relative to each other, as well as to the treatment of utility shareholders relative to customers. This objective usually requires rates that are not “arbitrary or capricious,” an allocation of business risk between a utility and its customers that matches risk with reward, and allocation of costs across customer classes based on cost-causation principles.

4. “Affordable utility service” means that almost all customers can afford utility service that satisfies essential energy and other needs. Meeting this requirement may require the utility to offer discounted rates to low-income households. For many low-income households, paying their utility bills under an unsubsidized rate may mean sacrificing the purchase of other commodities and services essential to their economic well-being. Funding of the subsidized rates would come from other customers.12

5. “Efficient consumption” means that consumers face prices for utility service that reflect cost of service, thereby inducing consumers to act efficiently. Below-cost prices result in wasteful use of utility service, while above-cost prices result in too little usage.13

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12 Whether state commissions and utilities should concern themselves with the unaffordability of utility service to low-income customers is an issue that has permeated public utility regulation for decades. Many public policy analysts have argued that the real problem is certain households having inadequate incomes to pay for their essential goods and services. (This problem worsens for low-income households consuming energy, since they generally have low energy-efficient appliances and poorly insulated homes.) They contend that state and federal legislatures, or other governmental entities, should address this social ill by supplementing the income of poor households and by offering them financial support for energy-efficiency improvements, which would be more effective and efficient than subsidizing the prices they pay for utility service.

13 This “efficient consumption” objective does not necessarily coincide with the objective of promoting what is commonly called “energy efficiency.” Energy efficiency measures the ratio of energy input (e.g., therms of natural gas) and output (e.g., comfort). This term differs from the concept of economic efficiency, which accounts for both physical inputs and outputs and their societal value, usually expressed in dollars. Promoting energy efficiency per se may
6. **“Efficient competition”** refers to the utility and its competitors (e.g., retail marketers) having equal opportunities to compete for customers. Pricing of utility services plays a crucial role in determining whether this condition holds. When a commission fixes the prices of the local utility at embedded cost, for example, retail marketers can attract customers of the utility even when they are less efficient, because they have more pricing flexibility than the local utility. Efficient competition usually results in no uneconomic bypass and favoritism toward a utility affiliate.

7. **“Moderate regulatory burden”** refers to the objective of a commission to avoid frequent future rate cases. Rate cases absorb significant commission staff resources and time, diverting those resources from other commission activities.

8. **“Promotion of specified social goals”** means that a commission might want to pursue objectives that lie outside the normal mainstream of regulation. A commission might feel strongly about promoting energy efficiency in an environment of high gas prices, or about the increased unaffordability of gas service to low-income households. In achieving these objectives, a commission would approve special rates that deviate from traditional ratemaking principles (e.g., economic development rates that lie below embedded cost but above long-run marginal cost.)

The relative weights placed on different ratemaking objectives vary across state commissions, and shift over time in response to economic and political forces. During the 1980s and early 1990s, bypass of large customers from the local gas distribution system – i.e., customers buying a gas service directly from pipelines or installing their own spur line connected to the main pipeline, thereby lower economic efficiency in that the benefits of increasing energy efficiency may fall short of the additional costs.

Economic efficiency takes into account: (1) the cost to society from satisfying the demands of utility consumers (i.e., productive efficiency) and (2) the value that consumers place on utility service (i.e., allocative efficiency). The keys to achieving economic efficiency are to set rates based on marginal cost principles and to give utilities strong incentives to operate efficiently. Economic efficiency helps to avoid the waste of resources from both consumption and production. Economic efficiency involves maximizing total net economic value, while equity or fairness involves the distribution of net value among producers and consumers. Another way to look at the two concepts is that what matters to economic efficiency is maximizing the size of the pie, while equity or fairness cares about the slicing of the pie. Ratemaking involves treating these two concepts interdependently as maximizing the size of the pie requires efficient pricing to consumers, which therefore encompasses slicing the pie at the same time.
leaving the local utility unable to recover its fixed costs – was a major concern for both gas utilities and state commissions. The commissions responded by approving special discounted rates, even though they were discriminatory in nature, to avoid the revenue loss resulting if these customers bought their gas directly off the interstate pipeline.\footnote{14} Competition between natural gas and oil in the industrial sector during the early and mid 1980s placed pressure on state commissions to offer special (i.e., value of service) rates to large customers with fuel switching capability. Since the rise of natural gas prices in 2000, several commissions have paid more attention to energy efficiency by encouraging or requiring gas utilities to spend more money on, and engaging more actively in, promoting cost-effective energy conservation. This increased emphasis by regulators on energy efficiency has permeated the debate over proper rate design. As another recent issue, gas utilities have argued that traditional ratemaking has jeopardized their ability to earn sufficient revenues in view of the continuous decline in gas usage per customer.

III. Ratemaking methods and trade-offs among regulatory objectives

A. The standard two-part tariff

This section starts out by reviewing the salient features of traditional ratemaking for gas utilities. The discussion focuses only on the two-part base rate (i.e., the non-gas component of retail rates), which has received much scrutiny in recent years.\footnote{15, 16} The two-part tariff evolved during the early 20th century to

\footnote{14} These special rates were in response to the shortcomings of strict embedded-cost pricing in a competitive marketplace where consumers are able to switch providers and utilities lack absolute monopoly power. Many commissions approved special rates (with the condition that they at least cover marginal cost), fearing that if they did not, a utility’s profits would fall and, ultimately, remaining customers would end up with higher rates, because a departing customer would no longer be contributing to the utility’s fixed costs.

\footnote{15} Since 2000, the non-gas component of retail prices has declined proportionately because of the rise in wholesale gas prices. For many gas utilities, the non-gas component represents about 20-30 percent of the retail price.

\footnote{16} For all states (except for Hawaii), the utility recovers its purchased gas costs through some automatic adjustment mechanism. In most states, the utility passes through dollar-for-dollar purchased gas costs subject to a prudence review. The ex post facto review typically applies a rebuttable-presumption-of-prudence standard whereby parties contesting prudence must provide evidence of unreasonable conduct by the utility at the time of gas purchasing without the benefit of hindsight. A number of gas utilities have a cost-sharing incentive
replace the one-part tariff where the gas utility recovered all of its costs in a volumetric charge. Gas utilities and state commissions supported the two-part tariff as a way to increase consumption, reduce average cost, and generate sufficient revenues to recover fixed costs.  

1. Description of the standard two-part tariff

Traditional gas rates must recover the cost of gas sold plus the cost of building, maintaining and operating the gas utility system. In this discussion, we will set aside the portion of rates related to the cost of gas sold, and focus on the remaining costs. These remaining costs comprise what is normally called the “base rate.” This base rate, in traditional ratemaking, is charged by means of a two-part tariff. The following arithmetical expression shows the standard two-part tariff for base rates set by gas utilities:

\[ B_i = C + p \cdot q_i, \]

where the base rate for customer \( i \) (\( B_i \), reflecting all non-gas costs) equals the sum of two components: the customer charge (\( C \)) applicable to all customers, and the volumetric distribution charge (\( p \)) times the quantity of gas consumed by customer \( i \) (\( q_i \)).

A mechanism that allows a utility to profit from exceptional gas-procurement performance and to absorb some of the costs from sub-par performance. (See K. Costello and J.F. Wilson, *A Hard Look at Incentive Mechanisms for Gas Procurement*, NRRI 06-15, November 2006.) Some state commissions recently have reviewed the existing automatic adjustment mechanisms in response to volatile wholesale gas prices. Commissions have tended to adjust rates more frequently, in some instances going from an annual or semi-annual adjustment to a quarterly or monthly adjustment. Reasons for this change include reducing the financial burden on the utility and avoiding a large sudden increase in prices to consumers, both of which stemmed from high and volatile natural gas prices.

The old one-part tariff structure had several problems. It resulted in (1) revenue instability for the utility, (2) poor (economically inefficient) price signals for customers, (3) failure to reflect higher cost to the utility for serving lower-usage customers, and (4) unfairness to high usage customers relative to low usage customers. Notwithstanding these negative outcomes, this rate design was an improvement over its predecessor, the unmetered fixed monthly bill (e.g., a customer pays $50 per month so matter how much gas she uses).

The formula above assumes a uniform volumetric distribution charge regardless of the volume consumed. Many gas utilities have block pricing where the volumetric distribution charge varies between blocks of consumption. One common rate design is the declining-block structure, which in recent years has fallen out of favor because it encourages additional gas consumption. Declining-
The base rate recovers those costs related to investment in, and operation of, a gas transmission and distribution system. The customer charge typically includes the direct cost of serving a customer, including the cost for meters, meter reading, billing and collection, servicing an account, call centers and other costs independent of gas usage. The volumetric transmission and distribution charge recovers the remaining non-gas costs of a utility. It includes both operating costs and capital costs not recovered in the customer charge.

Using a numerical example, assume that the monthly customer charge is $10, the volumetric distribution charge is $1.50 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) and monthly usage is 10 Mcf. Under this tariff structure, the customer’s bill (excluding purchased gas cost) would be $10 + ($1.50·10), or $25. If the customer did not consume any gas during the month, she would be charged $10. The marginal price to the customer, i.e., the cost to the customer of consuming one additional Mcf of local distribution service, would be $1.50. Under prevailing rate structures, the marginal price exceeds the marginal cost to the utility, since the marginal price includes fixed costs. A secondary outcome is that the average price of gas to the customer (i.e., the customer’s bill divided by monthly usage) decreases as the customer consumes more gas. In the example, the average price to a customer using 10 Mcf would be $2.50 per Mcf, while the average price at a usage level of 15 Mcf would be $2.17 per Mcf. This decline in average price reflects the decrease in a utility’s average costs as monthly consumption increases, because the fixed costs of the system (to the extent they are recovered through the non-varying customer charge) are divided by more units of sale.

2. Consequences of the two-part tariff

Gas utilities using the two-part rate structure recover much, if not most, of their fixed costs in the volumetric charge, which not only makes the rate structure economically inefficient but also incompatible with some of the other regulatory block rates, however, have the benefits of providing a utility with earnings stability (by allowing it to recover its fixed costs in the lower-usage blocks) and of promoting economic efficiency when it sets tail-blocks charges at or close to marginal cost. (Economic efficiency requires only that the pricing of the unit of service consumed at the margin corresponds to marginal cost – not that all units of service do.)

19 The monthly customer charge equals the allocated annual customer costs divided by the number of customer months.

20 The volumetric distribution charge equals the distribution costs (minus the costs recovered in the customer charge) divided by the annual sales as determined at the last rate case.
objectives. One reason for this practice is that regulators as a rule disfavor high monthly customer charges, which would result from reallocating fixed costs from the volumetric charge to the customer charge. For many gas utilities, over 90 percent of their non-gas costs reflect fixed costs, with the majority of those costs typically recovered in the volumetric charge. As discussed next, problems arising from this allocation include under-recovery (or over-recovery) of a utility’s prudent fixed costs and disincentives for a utility to promote energy efficiency.

The standard two-part tariff, as currently applied by most gas utilities, has several consequences. First, the recovery of some of the utility’s fixed costs – other than the fixed costs recovered through the customer charge – depends upon the level of gas usage. When usage falls (or rises), because of factors such as abnormal weather, the business cycle, changes in customer behavior, and appliance and building characteristics, a utility’s earnings also fall (or rise) because the utility must pay the fixed costs regardless of the revenue level. Where recovery of a large percentage of the fixed costs depends upon usage, a small change in usage can have a large effect on earnings. One consequence of linking fixed-cost recovery to usage is that the utility becomes riskier in the eyes of prospective investors and its cost of capital increases.

Second, because earnings fall with lower usage, the utility has a disincentive to promote energy conservation. If the volumetric charge includes only variable cost, then a drop in sales reduces costs and revenues proportionately, with no effect on earnings. This outcome would reduce any utility disincentive, at least between rate cases, to promote energy conservation.

Third, high usage customers bear a disproportionately higher share of fixed costs than low usage customers, even though much of these costs are more customer-related than usage-related. Examples of such costs, i.e., fixed costs recovered through the volumetric rate rather than through the customer charge, include the capital costs for distribution mains. Recovery of fixed costs also occurs lopsidedly during the winter or peak season when consumption is highest, which aggravates the problem of customers having high winter gas bills.

Fourth, the gas utility finds it more difficult to compete with alternative energy providers for large customers (e.g., oil retailers selling to industrial customers) because of the relatively high marginal price for gas delivery service. For high usage customers, a lower marginal price would reduce their total gas bills relative to a rate structure that allocates more of a utility’s fixed costs to the volumetric charge.
Fifth, because the volumetric distribution charge includes fixed costs, the tariff is economically inefficient. Customers would tend to under-use gas since the marginal price includes fixed costs. Ideally, from an economic-efficiency perspective, at the margin customers would pay a usage price equal to marginal cost.

Last, the incremental change in a customer’s gas bill from increased usage (for example, because of cold weather) would be greater than if the usage charge excluded all fixed costs. This outcome would tend to cause gas bills to fluctuate more, especially for residential customers during the winter months.

B. New proposed ratemaking practices

1. Motivations

As of early March 2007, thirty-one investor owned gas utilities had rate cases pending before state public utility commissions. In 2006, state commissions decided rate cases for twenty-four gas utilities. These utility proposals encompass both the cost recovery and rate-design aspects of rate setting. Many of these proposals involve new practices reflecting changes in market conditions for natural gas as well as in regulatory and energy policies. The major changes include:

1. The recent shift in policy by many state public utility commissions to encourage gas utilities to promote energy efficiency

2. Increased risk to gas utilities from higher gas prices causing a proliferation of bad debt expenses while simultaneously decreasing demand

3. Additional capital requirements caused in part by new safety regulations and the need to replace aging distribution mains (e.g., cast iron steel pipes)

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21 Some readers might argue that although the price signal per se would cause customers to under-consume, non-price factors (e.g., information and capital-market barriers, externalities) would lead to customers under-spend on energy conservation. The poor price signal provided by the standard tariff, according to this view, would therefore counteract those barriers and represent a second-best solution. A preferred solution would be to address directly the non-price factors impeding economically efficient energy conservation.

22 In recent years, electric and water utilities have also filed new rate designs and cost-recovery mechanisms, partially because of rising prices and an increased emphasis on reducing electricity and water usage.
4. Shifting regulatory priorities on the underlying objectives of ratemaking, including the need to assist low-income households and mitigate against high gas-bill volatility

The recent ratemaking proposals reflect the view of some gas utilities and other stakeholders that existing ratemaking practices, especially the longstanding reliance on the two-part tariff discussed in Part III, warrant revisiting because of changed market conditions and public-policy goals.\(^\text{23}\) The natural gas industry has undergone fundamental changes in just a few years. First, wholesale gas prices have become more volatile and difficult to predict, and have reached much higher levels than 1990 prices. Although almost all gas utilities have purchased gas adjustment mechanisms to shift to consumers the risks of these market dynamics, consumers have expressed a preference for price stability and have cut back on their gas usage. Recent evidence has shown that customer demand response to higher gas prices have intensified over the last two years.\(^\text{24}\)

Second, regulators and energy policymakers have intensified their efforts to promote energy efficiency, with gas utilities expected to play a more active role. Several state commissions have committed to implementing the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (www.epa.gov/solar/actionplan/report.htm), which affects both electric and gas utilities. A key recommendation of the Plan emphasizes the importance of ratemaking in aligning utility incentive with energy efficiency. Other state commissions have initiated proceedings to determine whether, and how, gas utilities should become more active in promoting energy conservation.

Third, high gas prices have aggravated the affordability problem for low-income households. Low-income households spend a much higher percentage of their incomes on natural gas than other households do. Partially because of the increased unaffordability of gas service to poor households, more customers have become delinquent in paying their gas bills, resulting in lost revenues to utilities that they did not anticipate at the time of the last rate case.

\(^\text{23}\) Over the past decade, both regulated and unregulated industries have undergone radical shifts in pricing practices. Internet service and telecommunications service are prime examples of this phenomenon. Numerous other examples exist for a wide range of industries where changes in market dynamics have led to new pricing practices.

\(^\text{24}\) Some gas utilities have reported a sharper decline in gas usage per customer (normalized for weather) over the past two years than in the previous 20-25 years. One study concluded that non-price factors like new building codes and appliance efficiency standards have contributed to the downward trend of gas usage per customer over the past several years. (See Frederick Joutz and Robert P. Trost, *An Economic Analysis of Consumer Response to Natural Gas Prices*, prepared for the American Gas Association, March 2007.)
Fourth, because of high gas price volatility, hedging has become more important. Hedging activities by a utility in both its gas purchasing and ratemaking practices can help to stabilize customers’ gas bills.

In sum, new ratemaking proposals stem mainly from the direct and indirect consequences of high natural gas prices since 2000. (See Table 1) Higher prices have increased risk to both utilities and their customers, calling into question the efficacy of prevailing ratemaking methods to promote the public interest in view of today’s market and public policy environment.

### Table 1: Consequences of High Natural Gas Prices

| • Fewer households find natural gas affordable |
| • Energy conservation becomes more beneficial |
| • Fuel-switching becomes more imminent |
| • Price elasticity effect becomes more pronounced |
| • Bad-debt expenses increase |
| • Both the utility and its customer generally face more risk |
| • Hedging becomes more important from both the utility and customer perspective |
| • Utility customers become less satisfied with their utility service and regulatory oversight |
| • Overall, the gas industry becomes less stable with usage levels, gas bills and utility earnings more volatile and uncertain |

2. **New ratemaking proposals**

A key issue in recent gas rate cases is whether the continuation of traditional ratemaking practices will allow a utility a reasonable opportunity to earn its authorized rate of return in light of the changes in the market environment and public policy, as discussed above. With several gas utilities arguing that traditional practices will not, they have proposed new cost and revenue riders in addition to new rate designs.

A list of new ratemaking proposals includes:25

- Rider for revenue deviations from some baseline level;26 hereafter, this paper refers to this mechanism as a revenue decoupling (RD) rider27

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25 The Appendix describes some of these ratemaking mechanisms.

26 The generic term “revenue decoupling” refers to the separation of a utility’s earnings from actual sales. Under this definition, revenue decoupling
includes riders, specific forms of declining-block rate structures, and a SFV rate design where the utility recovers all of its fixed costs in a non-usage charge.

27 Under RD riders, actual revenues correspond to the utility’s revenue requirement, as determined in the last rate case, with rate adjustments made between rate cases as sales volumes deviate from the predetermined baseline level (e.g., weather-normalized usage per customer). In contrast, under traditional ratemaking, the utility’s revenues change as sales volumes vary. With revenues more stable under a RD rider, the utility’s actual earnings would deviate less from the level established during the last rate case. One misperception is that a RD rider would guarantee that a utility earns its authorized rate of return between rate cases. RD riders reconcile revenues, not costs. Unexpected cost increases (or decreases) and fewer (or more) new customers than expected would cause actual return on equity to deviate from the expected return. A RD rider, however, would increase the likelihood of a utility earning its authorized rate of return.

28 Gas utilities have argued, among other things, that earnings sharing would extend the time between general rates cases, better link rates to more current information on costs and sales, and keep the commission current on the financial condition of a utility.

29 Most of these riders involve recovering the gas cost portion of bad debt expense in the purchase gas adjustment (PGA) mechanism. Utilities proposing these riders have argued that their bad debt has increased significantly over the past few years because of the combination of high gas commodity prices and more customers falling further behind in paying their gas bills. They conclude that the practice of recovering bad debt as a fixed expense in base rates is no longer appropriate.
• Rider for pension costs

• Rider for energy efficiency or demand-side management costs

• PGA-like mechanism that tracks under and over recovery of a utility’s fixed costs (i.e., fixed cost balancing accounts) with periodic fixed cost true-ups between rate cases

The new ratemaking proposals largely attempt to stabilize utility revenues and to allow recovery of certain costs outside a rate case review. They reflect the view that the longstanding use of a test year (i.e., a twelve-month period chosen to calculate the required revenue to recover a utility’s distribution non-gas costs) to measure certain costs and gas sales for the rate-effective period is no longer appropriate. The basic argument made by proponents of new ratemaking methods is that events in the natural gas sector have made costs and sales difficult to predict and unstable. Even with modification to historical costs and sales for “known and measurable” changes, according to this argument, a gas utility would still face high risk, reducing its ability to earn its authorized rate of return.

The concern by gas utilities over revenue stabilization stems from what they see as the asymmetrical distribution of sales around some baseline or normalized level of sales. That is, they perceive the probability of actual sales falling below some baseline level set by a commission in a rate case to exceed the probability of actual sales exceeding the baseline level. A major argument for this view is that commissions generally determine base rates assuming no continuation of a decline in gas usage per customer. Gas utilities have argued that this assumption is contrary to statistically based predictions and past trends.30

Most of the new ratemaking proposals by gas utilities involve the use of trackers or riders to allow the utility to adjust its rates outside of a rate case.31

30 Gas utilities in several rate cases have shown a decline in usage per customer over the past two decades. Although parties to these proceedings generally have not disputed this phenomenon, some have questioned whether this decline will continue in the future. Reduced consumption per customer does not imply that utilities’ total gas sales to residential customers will fall in the future. (See Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2007, February 2007 and other projections.) Most studies expect moderate growth in total residential sales over the next several years, even in view of a continued decline in sales per residential customer (with growth varying by state and region). These projections call for utilities’ revenues from residential sales to grow between rate cases because of the addition of new customers offsetting a decline in use per customer.

31 Trackers or riders refer to a mechanism that allows a utility to adjust its rates without having to file a formal rate review, although any resulting rate
For the past thirty years, state commissions have allowed utilities to recover changes in their purchased gas costs through a rider-type mechanism, commonly called a PGA mechanism. Some commissions have also permitted gas utilities to recover other costs, for example those related to energy efficiency activities, outside of a rate case.

Commissions generally frown upon pass-through of costs outside of a rate case (even when subject to a prudence review) unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Commission decisions have focused on whether to pass through costs, and make rate adjustments for unexpected changes in sales, outside of rate case review in light of the possible downside consequences.32

Historically, commissions apply a three-part test in judging the merits of a rider or tracker. The three-part requirement for commission approval of riders and trackers typically include: (1) the cost or sales activity must lie outside the control of the utility, (2) variations in outcomes can have a material effect on utility earnings, and (3) the activity is difficult to predict.

The reluctance of commissions to approve riders and trackers mainly lies with their effect on shifting risk to consumers and on diminishing regulatory lag. Regulatory lag refers to the time gap between when a utility undergoes a change in cost or sales levels, and when the utility can reflect these changes in new rates. Economic theory predicts that the longer the regulatory lag, the more incentive a utility has to control its costs. The reason is that when a utility incurs costs, the longer it has to wait to recover those costs, thus the lower its earnings become. Consequently, the utility would have an incentive to minimize additional costs. Commissions rely on regulatory lag as an important element in motivating utilities to act efficiently. Regulatory lag is a less than ideal method, however, for changes usually receive some level of regulatory oversight. These rate adjustments can occur because of the incurrence of special costs or the realization of sales departing from some predetermined baseline level. This mechanism is generally only applied under unusual circumstances. Some state commissions approving cost trackers place a cap on the amount recovered through the mechanism, with costs above the cap deferred for later recovery.

32 Prior to the recent interest in revenue decoupling, rate adjustments for sales focused mostly on weather normalization adjustments (WNAs). The mechanism adjusts customers’ monthly gas bills, usually during the winter heating season, to reflect weather patterns commensurate with “normal weather.” The rationale for WNAs centers on the effect of the traditional ratemaking practice to cause earnings to fluctuate based on actual sales. Twenty-seven state commissions currently allow at least one gas utility to use a WNA mechanism. (See K. Rogers, “Revenue Decoupling: Trend or Transitions,” presented at the Mid-Atlantic Conference of Regulatory Utilities Commissioners Annual Convention, June 5, 2007.)
rewarding an efficient, and penalizing an inefficient, utility. Some of the additional costs may fall outside the control of a utility (e.g., increase in the price of materials), and any cost declines may not relate to a more efficient utility (e.g., deflationary conditions in the general economy).

C. Trade-offs among objectives

1. Challenges for state commissions

The new ratemaking proposals advance some regulatory objectives while impeding others. The challenge for regulators is to weigh these objectives and measure (if possible) the effect of a ratemaking mechanism on each specified objective. Assigning weights requires judgment by the regulator, while examining the effects demands analytical skills supplemented by data and other unbiased information.

Table 2 shows how specific ratemaking practices (described in the Appendix) can have both positive and negative effects on different regulatory objectives. Stakeholders have proposed these practices before state commissions, who have either approved them or rejected them. (The author used his best judgment, applying economic analysis and available empirical evidence, in determining the effects of each ratemaking practice on either advancing or hindering individual objectives. Some readers may rightly disagree with these assessments.)

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33 This paper discusses some of these ratemaking practices. In the Appendix to this paper, the reader can find a brief description of each ratemaking practice; other publications contain more detailed descriptions. (See, for example, NARUC Subcommittee on Gas, Gas Distribution Rate Design Manual, 1989; American Gas Association, Gas Rate Fundamentals, 4th Edition, 1987; and M. Harunuzzaman and S. Koundinya, Cost Allocation and Rate Design for Unbundled Gas Services, NRRI 00-08, May 2000, available at www.nrri.ohio-state.edu).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratemaking Practice</th>
<th>Objective(s) Advanced</th>
<th>Objective(s) Hindered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Two-Part Tariff</strong></td>
<td>Public acceptability, fairness in risk sharing</td>
<td>Efficient price-driven gas consumption, revenue and earnings stability, promotion of utility-initiated energy efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue-Decoupling Rider</strong></td>
<td>Revenue and earnings stability, neutral utility incentives for the level of gas usage, fairness to the utility in recovering fixed costs</td>
<td>Fair allocation of business risk, public acceptability, efficient price-driven gas consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Straight Fixed-Variable Rate</strong></td>
<td>Revenue and earnings stability, efficient price-driven consumption, neutral utility incentives for the level of gas usage, more equitable cost allocation</td>
<td>Equity to low usage customers (many of whom may be low-income), public acceptability; gradualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weather Normalization Adjustment</strong></td>
<td>Revenue and earnings stability, winter gas-bill stability</td>
<td>Public acceptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inverted-Block Rate</strong></td>
<td>Promotion of customer-initiated conservation, assistance to low-income households</td>
<td>Revenue and earnings stability, allocative efficiency; non-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Declining-Block Rate</strong></td>
<td>Revenue and earnings stability, improved system utilization (i.e., productive efficiency)</td>
<td>Promotion of price-driven energy conservation, non-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost Rider</strong></td>
<td>Earnings stability, fairness to the utility, fewer rate cases</td>
<td>Robust incentives for cost control (less regulatory lag), fair allocation of risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost-Based Customer Charge</strong></td>
<td>Allocative efficiency, more levelized gas bills across seasons</td>
<td>Public acceptability, equity to low usage customers (many of whom may be low-income)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flexible Rate</strong></td>
<td>Responsive to competitive and other conditions, improved system utilization (i.e., productive efficiency), avoidance of uneconomic bypass</td>
<td>Non-discrimination, fairness to captive customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Contract</strong></td>
<td>Responsive to competitive and other conditions, improved system utilization (i.e., productive efficiency), avoidance of uneconomic bypass</td>
<td>Non-discrimination, fairness to captive customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discriminatory Rate in General</strong></td>
<td>Responsive to competitive and other conditions, improved system utilization (i.e., productive efficiency)</td>
<td>Fairness to captive customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate Based on Marginal Cost Allocation</strong></td>
<td>Price efficiency, improved system utilization (i.e., productive efficiency)</td>
<td>Preciseness of cost data, rate stability, public acceptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seasonal Rate</strong></td>
<td>Allocative efficiency, equitable cost allocation across seasons</td>
<td>Affordability, public acceptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Earnings Sharing</strong></td>
<td>Earnings stability, fewer rate cases, allocative efficiency</td>
<td>Robust incentives for cost control (less regulatory lag)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeted Subsidized Rate</strong></td>
<td>Affordability</td>
<td>Allocative efficiency, non-discrimination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next section of this paper attempts to show alternative strategies (i.e., decision rules) that regulators can apply to assess and compare the public-interest aspects of different ratemaking practices. All of these strategies, in different ways, take into account the underlying objectives of ratemaking, with regard to both their specification and their relative importance. Looking at Table 2, a state commission would find it difficult to rank and compare the ratemaking practices in advancing the public interest without first knowing the relative importance of each objective in addition to the trade-offs involved.

2. Illustrations of trade-offs among regulatory objectives

Ratemaking decisions made by a commission typically have conflicting consequences. That is, the ratemaking method approved advances some particular regulatory objectives while impeding others. The classic example is marginal cost pricing. (Marginal cost pricing sets price equal to the cost to the utility of the last unit of service.\(^{34}\)) This pricing rule promotes economic efficiency by providing consumers with proper price signals while, some argue, clashing with the objectives of equity and gradualism.

Another example of conflicting outcomes relates to seasonal pricing. (Under seasonal pricing, a gas utility would charge higher rates during the winter months when demand and marginal cost are the highest. For an electric utility, rates would typically be higher during the summer months.) This pricing method has the positive features of giving consumers better price signals, of resulting in a more efficient use of a distribution system’s facilities, and of requiring no special meters. Yet, some stakeholders have opposed, and some state commissions have rejected, seasonal pricing, for both the electric and gas industries, because it would cause rates to be higher during periods of peak consumption. The higher utility bill during peak periods would likely meet with public scorn, which it has in some instances, and negative media coverage.

Another example is special contracts to a large industrial customer. These contracts have the attractive features of mitigating uneconomic bypass\(^ {35}\) of

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\(^{34}\) Most often, utilities apply marginal cost principles to allocate costs. Once a utility determines the relative marginal costs of serving various customer classes, for example, marginal costs are then scaled to the utility’s total revenue requirements. Thus, the actual marginal cost would only equal the utility’s cost of service by accident and would not constitute the determining factor in establishing the class revenue requirements used to set rates.

\(^{35}\) Uneconomic bypass refers to the situation where a customer turns to a non-utility provider for one or more services when the alternative provider has higher total costs but lower prices. It is uneconomic because society incurs higher cost in meeting the demands of a customer. One major cause of uneconomic bypass is the inability of the local gas utility to lower its rates below fully allocated embedded costs, which under certain circumstances (e.g., a utility
responding to competition and of contributing to economic development. Yet, they do reflect discriminatory pricing, which conceivably could force other customers to “fund” these special contracts through higher rates, as these contracts result in the utility recovering less of its fixed costs from the industrial customer than what it recovered previously.\textsuperscript{36} Other examples abound where a particular ratemaking practice advances some objectives while hindering others.

Especially in regard to a revenue-decoupling rider and SFV rate design, stakeholders recently have made arguments reflecting the relative importance of different regulatory objectives.\textsuperscript{37} For a revenue-decoupling rider, the argument centers on whether circumstances warrant the use of a rider to protect the utility from the possibility of less-than-expected sales. Utilities have argued that in the absence of a rider, they will not have a reasonable opportunity to earn their authorized rate of return. Opponents of a rider have argued that a utility can offset revenue losses from declining usage per customer by adding new customers and improving its productivity.\textsuperscript{38} Some opponents of a RD rider also have argued that the downward movement of gas usage per customer in the past does not necessarily constitute a trend that will continue in the future.

Another argument relating to revenue-decoupling riders revolves around the issues of what role, if any, a gas utility should play in promoting energy efficiency and the incentives the utility needs to undertake this activity.

\begin{quote}
has a high level of surplus capacity) could far exceed its marginal cost. Another cause of uneconomic bypass is faulty rate design where certain customers within a grouping (e.g., high usage customers within the industrial class) pay more then the utility’s cost of serving them and, thus, higher then competitive alternatives.

\textsuperscript{36} Although the rates to other customers may be higher than before the special contract, they will be lower than what the rates would have been if the customer had actually bypassed the local utility, assuming the utility’s unrecovered sunk costs are assigned to the remaining customers rather than to the utility’s shareholders. .

\textsuperscript{37} See, for example, K. Costello, Revenue Decoupling for Natural Gas Utilities, NRRI 06-06, April 2006 (http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/nrri-pubs); and K. Costello, “Revenue Decoupling for Gas Utilities: Know Your Objectives,” presented at the Mid-Atlantic Conference of Regulatory Utilities Commissioners Annual Convention, June 5, 2007.

\textsuperscript{38} Opportunities to add new customers and improve productivity, of course, would vary from utility to utility. In the Southeast (where electricity rates are low relative to most other parts of the country), for example, gas utilities have seen residential customers switching to electric heat pumps. Thus, for these gas utilities at least, the prospects for adding new customers are dim.
\end{quote}
Opponents of these riders have argued that the utility should not involve itself with energy efficiency activities or if it does, a revenue-decoupling rider is still not justifiable.

The issues surrounding SFV rate design are contentious as well. Sometimes proposed to state commissions as an alternative to a RD rider (in terms of its ability to separate earnings from sales), it has met with criticism by commissions and some stakeholders. As Table 3 shows, the reader might expect state commissions to prefer a SFV rate design to a RD rider in view of the dominance of SFV in advancing seemingly important regulatory objectives. Yet, while some commissions have recently approved a SFV rate design, in most states gas utilities have steered away from proposing SFV, knowing well if they did, strong opposition from various sources, including commission staff, would ensue. Instead, gas utilities have more commonly proposed RD riders, with the majority of those proposals approved by state commissions. As discussed in the next section, one possible explanation for this disparate acceptance of these outwardly similar ratemaking mechanisms lies with the high weight commissions assigned to the negative features of SFV. SFV would adversely affect low usage customers, for example, some of whom may consume little gas but under SFV could face a significantly higher monthly minimum charge.

Table 3: Comparison of SFV with RD Rider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages of SFV over RD</th>
<th>Disadvantages of SFV over RD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More compatible with sound economic (e.g., marginal cost) principles</td>
<td>Adverse effect on low usage customers, many of whom may be low income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased competitiveness of the utility for high usage customers from lower volumetric charge</td>
<td>Reduced incentives for customer-initiated energy efficiency from a lower volumetric charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of intra-class subsidies favoring low usage customers</td>
<td>Possible significant increase in summer gas bills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpler to implement and for customers to understand</td>
<td>Likely stronger opposition from the public, stakeholders, and commission staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common pricing method for capital-intensive services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No periodic true-up or price changes between rate cases, with longer regulatory lag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More stable gas bills during the winter months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenly allocates the recovery of fixed costs across seasons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral utility incentives for promoting or reducing gas consumption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One way to look at a SFV rate design, relative to standard ratemaking, is that those customers who consume below the average-use level would have higher bills. The perception held by many state commissions and stakeholders is that many of the low usage customers are also low-income households.\footnote{Some analysts question this perception, as a higher percentage of low-income households reside in energy-inefficient homes than other households do, because of their financial constraints in purchasing energy-conservation hardware and services. Let us assume, however, that the evidence shows low-income households to consume, on average, smaller amounts of gas than other customers do. A commission can modify the SFV rate design to charge a lower monthly fixed charge to identified low-income households. Alternatively, the utility could offer a rebate to those customers. A rebate would change the form of the subsidy, not the fact of its existence.} One can conclude from the general rejection of SFV rate design is that even though SFV compared with a RD rider would be more economically efficient, result in more stable and levelized gas bills across seasons, would not require periodic true-ups, and is simpler for customers to understand, state commissions find either its disadvantages more persuasive or do not understand its advantages.\footnote{We also observe a number of industries with largely fixed costs pricing their services on a fixed basis. These services include DSL, Internet access, local phone, and cable and satellite TV.} State commissions apparently attach a high significance to continuing with a rate design favorable to low usage customers and to gain public acceptability. No other explanation comes to mind, although recently opponents of SFV have argued that this rate design discourages price-driven energy conservation. The reason for less price-driven energy conservation is the lowering of the price of gas consumption at the margin to include only the gas-cost component.

IV. Strategies for assessing ratemaking practices

Ratemaking requires consideration of statutes and legal rules, economic principles, precedent, the trade-offs among different regulatory objectives, including public acceptability. Regulators need to apply their judgment on (1) what objectives ratemaking should achieve, (2) the relative significance of each objective, and (3) the willingness to impede certain objectives to advance others (e.g., the loss of economic efficiency from rates deemed fairer).

Before applying this judgment, the regulator should begin by reviewing unbiased information and analyzing how each ratemaking option advances some objectives while hindering others.\footnote{This information could come from commission staff testimony and other advisory documents that staff can draft for commissioners.} (See Table 2, for examples.) Overall, good
ratemaking requires judgment, and unbiased analysis and information to arrive at a decision that best serves the public interest. Judgment reflects the preference of a decision-maker for different objectives underlying ratemaking and the strategy it applies based on the available, though often incomplete, information. This section of the paper will discuss different strategies for organizing and interpreting the information presented to commissioners.

A. Problems with the current decision process for ratemaking

An optimal process for decision-making by state commissions involves ordering and interpreting the information presented to them in a way that best advances the public interest. This approach requires that commissions: (1) define the public interest in terms of the objectives they assign to ratemaking, (2) comprehend the effect of each ratemaking proposal on advancing and impeding the different objectives, and (3) apply a logical decision-making strategy to select or reject a ratemaking proposal.

The current process applied by state commissioners for deciding on ratemaking proposals tends to have several suboptimal features in common. First, commissions often do not explicitly consider and define the criteria for assessing ratemaking options. Although commissioners take into account different objectives for ratemaking, they often do not express what those objectives are, how to measure them, and what effect they have on the public interest. Commissioners might express the need for “just and reasonable” rates but they do not typically say what criteria (e.g., the acceptable degree of price discrimination, the proper allocation of business risk between shareholders and consumers) would support such rates. “Just and reasonable” thus becomes a mantra, or a post-hoc justification, rather than a decision criterion whose effect on a decision can be traced.

Second, commissioners often choose ratemaking options based on implicit weights for individual objectives, without identifying those weights in the written opinions. These opinions oftentimes fail to articulate that they favor one ratemaking practice over another because certain objectives are more important than others in serving the public interest. The public thus remains uninformed about the real reasons for the decision.

Third, ratemaking decisions often forego comprehensive “grounds up” analysis in favor of focus on the marginal gains over the status quo or over other

42 Suboptimal decision-making results in an outcome that fails to maximize the public interest. Such an outcome can come from inadequate availability of objective information, the intent by the decision-maker to serve his own interests or special interests, and the lack of an analytical framework from which the decision-maker processes the information presented to them.
alternatives. Commissions typically make ratemaking decisions by reacting to the positions of stakeholders, who present conflicting information, in the absence of pre-existing commission statements enunciating ratemaking principles and weights assigned to different objectives. Taking a reactive stance makes commissioners vulnerable to the political influence of individual special interests by attempting to “balance” the positions of those interests (which may have varying degrees of effective representation in the rate case) in reaching a compromised decision. Often, trying to balance those positions does not advance the public interest.

Fourth, commissioners often make trade-offs among different objectives on an ad hoc basis. They do not explicitly analyze, for example, the trade-off between allowing a utility to recover certain costs through a rider and the incentive of the utility to control those costs. Another example is the trade-off between avoiding a dramatic change in rate design and the consequences of continuing with economically inefficient rates. Over time, policy becomes unpredictable, thus diminishing credibility.

Overall, the ratemaking process across the states frequently lacks clear regulatory guiding principles, priorities or guidelines creating a moving target for commissions, utilities and other stakeholders. Consequently, the regulatory process is less efficient and resource-draining than it could otherwise be.

B. Multi-criteria decision analysis

1. Conceptual issues

An approach generically known as multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) is well suited for ranking and comparing different ratemaking options based on evaluation criteria. This approach can help to align unbiased and analytical information with commissioners’ judgment in a systematic manner, thus allowing for more rational, transparent and efficient decision-making.43

MCDA is especially useful for addressing problems of a multi-objective nature, where decision-makers have to make trade-offs among multiple objectives. MCDA can assist commissions in making these trade-offs by providing them with an orderly framework to assess the implications of different value judgments for decisions. By varying the weights or significance attached to utility-initiated energy efficiency activities, for example, a commission can

43 As one analyst has stated, MCDA can “provide help and guidance to the decision-maker in discovering his or her most desired solution to the problem (in the sense of that course of action which best achieves the decision-maker’s long-term goals.” See T.J. Stewart, “A Critical Survey on the Status of Multiple Criteria Decision Making Theory and Practice,” OMEGA, vol. 2, nos. 5-6 (1992): 569-86.
determine any change in the ranking of a revenue-decoupling rider relative to other ratemaking options. Another example is where MCDA can help to determine if an increased emphasis on price-induced energy conservation causes declining-block rates to fall below some threshold level for acceptance.

The application of MCDA to ratemaking requires several steps:

a. **Frame the decision problem:** Two key questions recently have confronted state commissions: (a) Does the traditional ratemaking method deny a gas utility the reasonable opportunity to earn its authorized rate of return? and (b) Does the traditional ratemaking method provide a gas utility with a weak incentive or disincentive to support energy efficiency? A related question is how a commission can promote the twin objectives of revenue sufficiency and energy efficiency with minimal negative effects on other objectives (e.g., the “fair” allocation of business risk, public acceptability).

b. **Define the objectives and the set of evaluation criteria:** MCDA uses criteria to operationalize the objectives for comparing and evaluating potential options. An objective indicates a direction toward improved outcomes; for example, a stronger incentive for a utility to promote energy efficiency, or a better opportunity for a utility to earn its authorized rate of return. A criterion or attribute measures an objective in a way useful for analysis; the expected number of customer complaints, for example, can indicate public acceptability, and the relationship of price to marginal cost can help to gauge the presence of efficient consumption.

c. **Specify the options:** What ratemaking practices should a commission review, for example, in addressing the problem of revenue sufficiency and other problems warranting further consideration?

d. **Develop a performance matrix:** Each row in the matrix describes an option and each column measures the performance of the option against each objective or criteria (the column entries represent, for example, how well each option promotes the objective of economic efficiency). The next subsection illustrates a performance matrix.

e. **Identify the preferences of decision makers:** This step comprises the normative aspect of MCDA, where the decision-maker designates preferences for the different objectives or criteria. The identification and measurement of preferences allows the decision-maker to assign weights. A decision-maker can express her preferences by ranking the criteria, by assigning numerical weights, by identifying criteria as “must haves” and others as “desirable but optional,” or by verbal evaluations.

f. **Select a method that aggregates the information presented to decision-makers for ranking and comparing the different options:** This step
allows for the comparison of two or more options with varying performance over the range of objectives or criteria. The method constitutes a decision rule or strategy for sorting and evaluating the information available to decision-makers.

- Interpret the results and apply sensitivity or robustness analyses: Decision-makers should not solely rely on MCDA to reach decisions; this tool, however, should assist in providing support for any decision made. The robustness of a decision also depends on whether the selected option continues to rank the highest, for example, as the decision-maker assigns a set of different weights for the objectives or criteria.

2. Illustration of MCDA application

The relevant question facing several state commissions today is what gas ratemaking options best address the factors affecting the cost and risk of providing gas service. Previously, this paper identified the underlying arguments for a different ratemaking approach. First, under the traditional two-part tariff, a utility is more unlikely in the current market environment to earn its authorized rate of return than in the past when demand for gas was more robust and stable. This outcome results from the combination of the conditions that (1) a utility recovers most of its fixed costs in the volumetric charge, (2) declining gas usage per customer is likely to continue in the future, and (3) the base rates set in the last rate case assumes no future decline in gas usage per customer. Second, since the promotion of energy efficiency has emerged as a legitimate activity of gas utilities, the extant ratemaking approach conflicts with the efforts of utilities to reduce their sales.

Let us assume that a hypothetical commission has four ratemaking objectives: (1) revenue sufficiency, (2) promotion of utility-initiated energy efficiency measures that reduce gas consumption, (3) economic efficiency and (4) public acceptability. The criteria or metrics used to measure these four objectives include the likelihood that a utility would earn its authorized rate of return, the effect of energy-efficiency activities on a utility’s earnings, the relationship of price to marginal cost, and the number and intensity of consumer complaints.

Let us next assume for simplicity that the three ratemaking options under consideration include the existing method (i.e., the standard two-part tariff where the volumetric charge includes most of a utility’s fixed costs), a RD rider and a straight fixed-variable rate design. Although other ratemaking methods might address the alleged problems of revenue insufficiency and utility disincentives for energy efficiency – a declining block rate structure and an earnings sharing

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44 A state commission might have other objectives, but for this example it considers the four specified ones as the critical ones for decision-making.
mechanism, for example – the assumption is that the commission, for whatever reason, would not seriously consider them.45

The next step in the MCDA process would require the commission staff or some other objective party46 to assess the performance of the candidate ratemaking options according to each criterion. This part of MCDA demands objective analysis and information compiled by commission staff. Judgment is necessary, but it is objective judgment. This aspect of the ratemaking process is more scientific in nature, as predicting the outcomes for the different ratemaking options relies on economic theory and empirical evidence on the experiences of the options in real-world applications. Let us assume that the analyst gives the following scores (from a scale of 1-5, with a higher score indicating better performance) to each option for each criterion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratemaking Method/Objective</th>
<th>Revenue sufficiency</th>
<th>Incentives for energy efficiency</th>
<th>Economic efficiency</th>
<th>Public acceptability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard tariff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD rider</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFV</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each criterion, the performance scores require at the minimum how each option compares with the others. We know that the utility is less likely under both the RD rider and SFV, for example, to experience a revenue shortfall than under the standard two-part tariff. For some readers, to say that each of these methods should receive a score of five while the standard method receives a score of two would seem hard to fathom. Yet, these scores could come from objective information and analysis. The commission staff, for example, could compute the average deviation of actual earnings from allowed earnings over the past several years, assuming each ratemaking mechanism was in place. Assigning scores to each option requires judgment by the analyst supported by objective information.47

45 The commission might eliminate outright these other ratemaking options because they impede critical regulatory objectives previously enunciated by the commission.

46 An objective party would advocate the public interest rather than special interests.

47 Even for the criterion “public acceptability,” a commission could receive information from a survey of consumers or other focus groups to quantify the performance scores for each ratemaking option.
Next, the commissioners collectively (i.e., the decision-maker) must express their relative preference for each criterion by assigning relative weights to them. This activity is a commissioner-level activity because it requires balancing various elements of the public interest. Let us assume that commissioners assign the following weights (which add up to 100 percent):

- Revenue sufficiency: 30%
- Incentives for utility-initiated energy efficiency: 20%
- Economic efficiency: 10%
- Public acceptability: 40%

The weighting of each criterion by decision-makers (i.e., the commissioners) requires purely subjective judgment. The above illustration shows that the commissioners assign the most weight to how the public will react to any ratemaking method – a weight four times as heavy as the weight assigned to economic efficiency. The hypothetical commissioners allot the next highest weight to revenue sufficiency. At the other extreme, they assign the lowest weight to economic efficiency. The commissioners consider revenue sufficiency to be three times more important in serving the public interest than economic efficiency, and one and a half times more important than incentives for utility-initiated energy efficiency.

The next step involves combining the performance scores and “criterion” weights to compare and rank the different options. One strategy or decision rule (the next subsection identifies other strategies) is to add up the scores for each option, weighted by the significance attached to each criterion, and rank the options based on the weighted scores. We can express this so-called additive linear (i.e., decision) rule as:

\[ V_j = \sum w_i s_{ij} \]

where \( w_i \) represents the weight assigned to the \( i \)th criterion and \( s_{ij} \) is the score ascribed to the \( j \)th option for the \( i \)th weight. The overall value for each option \( (V_j) \) equals the performance score for each criterion (for example, the performance score of SFV for promoting economic efficiency, which in the illustration equals five, times the weight of that criterion), summed across all criteria. In other words, the overall score for each option is a weighted average performance metric, where the weights represent the relative importance of each criterion. The additive linear rule is appropriate only if the scores assigned to one criterion do not affect the scores assigned to other criteria (e.g., the performance score

48 Commissions should not view public acceptability as something necessarily outside the control of the ratemaking process. How the public reacts to a particular ratemaking option would depend, for example, on efforts to educate customers on the justification for the option and on its content.
assigned to revenue sufficiency is independent of the score assigned to economic efficiency); that is, the criteria are mutually exclusive.

This aggregation rule involves simple arithmetic and has intuitive appeal as an indicator of the public interest. The total-score concept coincides with the utilitarian theory that options with the highest scores would have the most beneficial effect on the public interest. The additive linear rule provides a cardinal ranking of options, revealing both the order and the “outcome” distances between options. The weights reflect the trade-offs between different objectives. By pursuing the SFV option, for example, a commission impedes the “public acceptability” objective. Comparing and ranking the options based on total scores account for the importance of all criteria collectively. Under the rule, maximizing the weighted sum of the criteria leads to a desirable option.

Table 4 illustrates the construction of a performance matrix applying the weights and performance scores given above. The example shows that the RD rider has the highest total score with SFV rate design having the lowest score. The reason for the attractiveness of the RD rider, relative to the standard tariff option, is its better performance in advancing the objectives of revenue sufficiency and incentives for utility-initiated energy efficiency. The trade-off is that the commissioners deem the RD rider to have lower public acceptability. If commissioners choose the RD-rider option, implicitly they are willing to risk the possibility of public disapproval – and perhaps have planned to take measures to address the disapproval by explaining the long-term benefits of its decision -- to advance what they consider objectives that are more important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratemaking Option/Criterion</th>
<th>Revenue sufficiency w = 30%</th>
<th>Incentives for utility-initiated energy efficiency w = 20%</th>
<th>Economic efficiency w = 10%</th>
<th>Public acceptability w = 40%</th>
<th>Total score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard tariff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD rider</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFV</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the SFV option, in this example it ranks the lowest because of the combination of the high weight assigned to public acceptability and its low
performance for this criterion. From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the SFV option outperforms the other options. Yet, this outcome contributes little to its total score because of the low weight assigned by the hypothetical commissioners to economic efficiency.\textsuperscript{49} The preference of RD riders over SFV suggests that, with these two options neutralizing each other for the objectives of revenue sufficiency and incentives for utility-initiated energy efficiency, public acceptability dominates the economic-efficiency criterion. For convenience, our illustration simplifies the real world, where state commissions may frown upon SFV for other reasons. These reasons may include the adverse effect it would have on low usage customers and the fundamental change in rate design that it represents.\textsuperscript{50}

In determining the robustness of the relative scores for the different ratemaking options, commissioners can vary the weights assigned to the criteria in addition to the performance scores for each option-criterion combination.\textsuperscript{51} Let us first assume that commissioners view SFV as having the same public acceptability as the RD-rider option. In that scenario, SFV would have the highest score. (In Table 4, assigning a performance score of three to the SFV-public acceptability cell brings the total score for SFV to 3.8.) Assigning a higher weight to economic efficiency could also improve the score for SFV relative to the other options.

The previous illustration applying MCDA simplifies the complexities of real-world ratemaking decisions by state commissions. It shows, however, how this decision-making tool provides a conceptual framework for better understanding why commissions prefer some ratemaking options over others. If a commission seems to lean toward a particular option scoring poorly in all categories other than public acceptability, the commission would know that public acceptability implicitly dominates all others. The commission might then want to reevaluate this propensity, recognizing that it would jeopardize other objectives also deemed important (although lesser so).

\textsuperscript{49} This explanation seems consistent with recent experiences where RD riders have met with more approval by state commissions than SFV has. At the time of this writing, state commissions across the country have approved a SFV rate design for five gas utilities and have approved a RD rider for seventeen utilities. Gas utilities in eleven states had RD riders pending before state commissions.

\textsuperscript{50} In other words, a commission may disfavor SFV because it violates a “fairness” standard and the “gradualism” objective.

\textsuperscript{51} The performance scores might not require sensitivity testing when based on objective analysis. Because of the uncertainties over some of the performance score, however, commissioners may find sensitivity testing useful.
For commissions, applying a systematic approach like MCDA can help make ratemaking decisions, and the underlying reasoning, more explicit, rational, efficient and transparent. It can assist commissions in making trade-offs among multiple objectives by allowing commissions to consider the implication of different value judgments on the relative importance of each objective (i.e., whether changing the weights for the objectives will change the ranking of options). Solving a multi-criteria problem, such as ratemaking, usually involves finding a solution by making trade-offs among the different objectives. Also from a utility perspective, knowing the trade-offs, values and rationale of a commission in using MCDA could help a utility to better understand and respond to commission policy from the outset. MCDA can achieve maximum success and benefit, therefore, than if the decision-making process is done in a vacuum.

Table 5 illustrates the major tasks for commissions in executing MCDA. These tasks coincide with the seven steps of MCDA identified earlier in this section. A commission might find it difficult to perform all of these tasks quantitatively. At the minimum, however, it can at least qualitatively undertake these tasks in its decision-making process. A commission can assess whether a particular rate design would hinder certain objectives while advancing others without knowing exactly the overall effect on the public interest.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Framing the decision problem            | • What is the nature and consequences of problems with the existing ratemaking mechanism?  
• How would the situation look under ideal conditions?  
• How would alternative ratemaking options address the problems?  
• In general terms, what effect would the ratemaking options have on individual regulatory objectives? |
| Defining the objectives and evaluation criteria | • Articulating ratemaking principles underlying “just and reasonable” prices  
• Identifying criteria of ratemaking consistent with those principles |
| Specifying the ratemaking options       | • Identifying ratemaking options that can address current problems |
| Developing the performance matrix       | • Collecting unbiased information  
• Analyzing each candidate ratemaking option for each specified criterion  
• Ranking or measuring the performance of each ratemaking option for each criterion |
| Identifying the preferences of the commissioners | • Ranking or weighting of criteria by commissioners |
| Selecting a strategy or decision rule   | • Combining the information from the performance matrix with the commissioner’s preferences for each criterion  
• Comparing each ratemaking option based on a decision rule (e.g., additive linear rule) |
| Interpreting the results and applying sensitivity analysis | • Evaluating each ratemaking option based on the decision rule  
• Identifying the stability of the relative rankings with varying criterion weights and performance assessments |
3. Alternative strategies or decision rules

In using the generic MCDA approach, commissions can choose from several strategies in deciding on what ratemaking practice(s) to approve and reject. The previous discussion focused on one strategy, the additive linear rule, which considers all criteria, weights them and multiplies them by the performance scores for each option. The decision-maker then ranks the options based on total scores.

The MCDA literature identifies several other strategies, which require less information and are less demanding than the additive linear rule:

a. **Bounded rationality strategy**: The decision-maker finds an option acceptable even if not optimal; this strategy avoids having to assign quantitative weights to each criterion. The decision-maker uses the rule of thumb that an option is acceptable, at least for further consideration, when it meets or surpasses a threshold for the most important criteria. Assume that commissioners deemed equity and revenue sufficiency as the only critical criteria. As long as an option seems not to violate fairness standards in addition to allowing the utility a reasonable opportunity to earn its authorized rate of return, commissioners can find the option acceptable if not the superior choice. Passing muster, for example, may mean that a ratemaking option achieves a minimum score (say 3 or 4) for the criteria equity and revenue sufficiency.

b. **Elimination-by-aspects strategy**: This strategy is similar to the bounded rationality strategy in eliminating those options that fail to satisfy critical criteria or do not have highly desirable attributes. It proceeds to set a threshold value for the most important criterion and then proceed to the next important criterion, and so forth. A commission could exclude, for example, any option that received a score of two or lower on “economic efficiency.” One outcome of this strategy, as well as of the bounded rationality strategy, is that an option could outperform another option for most of the criteria but the decision-maker rejects it if it fails the most significant ones. This strategy becomes less problematic to the extent that the most important criteria overwhelm the other criteria (for which this strategy gives little consideration) in advancing the public interest. The commission might assign extremely low weights to these other criteria, thus assuming that they have little effect on the public interest.

c. **Incrementalism strategy**: This strategy compares the performance of new possible options with the option currently in place. The intent is to look for options that can best overcome the problems associated with the current option. The term “incrementalism” refers to the nature of this strategy to improve

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52 Undue discriminatory rates, and rates that shift all risks to consumers when the utility can better shoulder those risks and have some control over them, would seem to violate a fairness standard.
upon the status quo, rather than take a comprehensive review of all options in terms of their overall effect on the public interest. This strategy might limit a commission’s review of ratemaking options, for example, to those that accommodate a utility facing competition and avoid the possibility of uneconomic bypass. The commission might confine its review to ratemaking options like special contracts, discounted tariffs or value of service prices. The commission might focus almost exclusively on the efficacy of a rate to allow the utility to compete on an equal basis with competitors. By ignoring other rate objectives, or giving them inadequate consideration, the commission risks approving a rate that, while promoting the objective at the center of attention, impedes other objectives that affect the public interest as well.

d. **Lexicographic strategy:** This strategy assigns a distinctly higher weight to certain criteria. It proceeds by ranking the options based on the most important criteria. If two options tie, the decision-maker then ranks them based on the second most important criterion, and so forth. If commissioners deem revenue sufficiency as the most important criterion, as an example, it could view the RD rider and SFV rate design options as equals. If commissioners identify incentives for utility-initiated energy efficiency as the second most important criterion, they may again consider the two options as equals. If then commissioners deem public acceptability as the third most important criterion, they might then decide to choose the RD rider over SFV.

e. **Conjunctive strategy:** This strategy requires that for any single option to warrant non-rejection it must meet a minimum threshold for each criterion. A decision-maker might reject outright a declining-block rate structure just because it violates the objective of encouraging price-driven energy efficiency. A seasonal rate structure might also not pass muster because of the large effect it could have on increasing utility bills during the period of peak usage.53

A commission can combine different strategies for selecting a ratemaking option. It can eliminate certain options, for example, using the bounded rationality strategy and then apply the additive linear rule to assess the surviving options. Taking our previous illustration, a commission might immediately eliminate the SFV option because of its low score for public acceptability, and

53 Similar reasoning can explain the little use of real-time pricing for small electricity customers. Depending on the specific design, such pricing can result in highly volatile prices that a commission may deem would lead to widespread public opposition. Real-time pricing could also lead to customers having higher utility bills if they do not curtail their consumption during peak periods, again depending on the rate design. (See K. Costello, “An Observation on Real-Time Pricing: Why Practice Lags Theory,” *The Electricity Journal*, vol. 17, no.1 (January-February 2004): 21-25.)
then select either the standard rate option or the RD rider option based on the additive linear rule.

A commission may also supplement any of these strategies by adapting them to new information. A commission can review a new ratemaking mechanism after a few years to determine whether it has performed as expected. This review involves both monitoring performance and revisiting the objectives, the performance scores under those objectives, and the weights for the objectives. As an illustration, assume that a commission previously approved a RD rider but circumstances have changed in three years where the gas usage per customer has ended its historical downward trend, and utility-initiated energy efficiency has becomes less important because of sharply falling gas prices. This scenario should cause a commission to pause and reconsider continuing with the RD rider.\textsuperscript{54} By not reviewing periodically new ratemaking mechanisms or even longstanding ones for that matter, the risk is that the mechanism, although tenable when approved, might no longer serve the public interest.

Scores for performance range from one to five, with a higher score indicating better performance. The boldface score in each cell equals the performance score for the ratemaking option for a criterion times the weight of the criterion. The weighted score for the revenue-sufficiency performance of the standard ratemaking option, for example, equals 2 x 30% = .6.

V. Conclusions

The conflicting effect of different ratemaking practices on regulatory objectives exemplifies the complexity of commission decision-making in assessing the different practices. Commissions usually assign a set of objectives to ratemaking, each having a different effect on the public interest. When a commission considers different ratemaking options it also has to consider the trade-offs involved. In supporting marginal cost pricing, for example, a commission advances the goal of economic efficiency while possibly impeding the goals of gradualism and fairness. The observation that commissions infrequently endorse marginal cost pricing infers that they consider the downside effects of this pricing methodology to dominate any economic-efficiency benefits. Countless other examples exist where a commission has to contemplate the positive and negative outcomes of a rate proposal before reaching a decision.

\textsuperscript{54} Such a review assumes the RD rider had negative features (e.g., risk shifting to consumers) that the commission judged to fall short of the positive features, with the commission consequently approving the mechanism. Later, these positive features might no longer be relevant, thus calling into question the merits of the RD rider.
State commissions should take a rational and pro-active stance on ratemaking. State commissions often react to the filings of utilities and the positions of other stakeholders in the absence of predetermined principles and criteria for ratemaking. Under this strategy, the utility takes the first step in framing the issues in line with its interests, which may conflict with the public interest. As a preferred approach, a commission should take the initiative by laying out ratemaking principles and by identifying the objectives /criteria that a ratemaking proposal should follow. Ratemaking principles would tend to be invariant over time, as they should represent a general guide to good ratemaking under a wide array of market, technological and political conditions. Objectives/criteria, on the other hand, can change as markets evolve and the economic and political landscape changes. New ratemaking objectives can emerge, with some old ones discarded or relegated to a lower status. How commissions weigh these objectives can change over time and vary among utilities as they face different circumstances.

The MCDA approach presented in this paper can improve regulatory decisions by making more explicit the relationship between different ratemaking options and the public interest. (See Table 6 for a comparison of the current approach used by most state commissions for ratemaking with the MCDA approach.) It allows a commission to assess systematically proposals based on both unbiased and subjective information. Under this approach, prior to a utility proposal, a commission would have enunciated its ratemaking principles and objectives in a public proceeding. The MCDA approach helps commissions to (a) recognize the overriding goal of serving the public interest, (b) articulate their objectives and the relative importance of each, and (c) apply a decision rule or strategy that takes as input unbiased information and analysis as well as the ratemaking principles and objectives previously enunciated. Under one application of this approach, commissions specify and weight the objectives, analyze the effects of each ratemaking option on those objectives, and evaluate and rank each option in terms of satisfying the overall objectives (i.e., serving the public interest).
Table 6: Comparison of the Current Decision-Making Process for Ratemaking with the MCDA Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Approach</th>
<th>MCDA Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The commission defines the public interest in terms of a list of principles and attributes underlying ratemaking (based on past decisions and other past actions taken by the commission) (no explicit or implicit weighing of objectives in advancing the public interest)</td>
<td>• In a separate public forum, the commission identifies the underlying objectives of ratemaking and the relative importance of each one (i.e., the commission constructs a “public interest” index that relates the public interest to weighting of the underlying objectives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A utility files ratemaking proposals rationalized on the basis of advancing those regulatory objectives skewed to its own interest</td>
<td>• A utility files ratemaking proposal addressing each underlying objectives identified by the commission (i.e., makes arguments for its rate proposal using commission guidelines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other stakeholders, with their own interests, respond to utility proposal with criticisms and recommendations</td>
<td>• Other stakeholders respond to the utility proposal by addressing the objectives previously identified by the commission, either for opposing the utility proposal or for recommending an alternative ratemaking proposal, or both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commission staff advises commissioners on the proposals and recommendations of stakeholders</td>
<td>• Commission staff complies unbiased information and conducts an objective and comprehensive analysis of ratemaking proposals by stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commission staff sometimes proposes its own preferred ratemaking mechanism</td>
<td>• Commission staff makes recommendation taking into account both its analysis and previously enunciated commission guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commissioners issue an order rationalizing their decision and its rejection of proposals, based partially on reaching a compromise of the different positions</td>
<td>• Commissioners issue an order rationalizing their decision based on consideration of all the objectives of ratemaking previously identified and the “public interest” index, in addition to the information provided by stakeholders and commission staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix

Descriptions of different ratemaking practices

Standard two-part tariff: The utility recovers non-gas costs from customers by charging them a fixed customer charge plus a volumetric or usage charge. The utility recovers most of its fixed costs (i.e., costs that do not vary with customer usage, at least in the short run) through a volumetric charge. The utility’s ability to recover its authorized rate of return depends on the level of gas sales. With fixed costs recovered through a volumetric charge, customers receive inefficient price signals. The utility would have an incentive to promote gas sales, as additional sales would increase earnings since additional revenues would exceed incremental costs.

Revenue-decoupling (RD) rider: The utility adjusts its rates between rate cases for sales deviating from some baseline level. If a utility’s actual sales per customer over a specific period fall below the level assumed in setting existing rates, the utility could increase its rates to compensate for the revenue shortfall. This mechanism helps to stabilize a utility’s revenues and earnings. It shifts some business risk to customers, since a fall in sales would have no direct financial effect on a utility but it would increase rates. For this reason, the utility is indifferent to the level of sales, thereby removing any harm from energy efficiency either initiated by it or its customers.

Straight fixed-variable rate: The utility recovers all of its fixed costs (both customer and demand related) through a fixed monthly charge (e.g., customer charge) that is independent of customer usage. It recovers all of its variable costs (i.e., costs that vary with the quantity of service) through a volumetric charge. Similar to a RD rider, this rate design separates a utility’s earnings from its actual sales. This rate structure provides customers with price signals conducive to efficient gas consumption. It also removes any utility disincentive to promote energy efficiency, since any revenue declines would equal avoided costs. Compared to the standard two-part tariff, this rate structure would increase the gas bills of low usage customers and decrease the bills of high usage customers; it would also tend to reduce winter gas bills and increase summer bills. Finally, compared to the standard two-part tariff, this rate structure reduces the benefits to consumers from using less gas.

Weather normalization adjustment: The utility adjusts its rates to account for sales deviating from some baseline level because of abnormal weather. Since usually a gas utility’s marginal price is greater than avoided cost, sales fluctuations affect a utility’s earnings; namely, reduce earnings when sales fall and increase it when sales increase. The major rationale for this mechanism is that weather is difficult to predict and weather conditions have a significant effect on both sales and utility earnings. A weather normalization adjustment helps to
stabilize both a utility’s earnings and customers’ winter gas bills (e.g., with an extremely cold winter, rates would be adjusted downward to account for higher than normal-weather sales). On the downside, concerns may arise over the shifting of sales risk to customers and the public perception that the mechanism primarily serves to protect the utility from weather-related events, namely, warmer-than-normal winters.

**Inverted-block rate:** The customer pays an increased rate for gas consumed at successively higher blocks. As an illustration, the customer would pay $3.00 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) for the 100 Mcf, and $5.00 for all consumption over 100 Mcf. This rate structure promotes energy conservation by discouraging customers from using larger quantities of gas. One form of this rate structure, referred to as a lifelines rate, has the purpose of keeping gas costs down for low-income customers, who presumably consume less gas than other customers. When the marginal cost of a utility does not increase with additional consumption, inverted rates reduce economic efficiency and result in price discrimination against high usage customers. Inverted rates may set the rate of the initial block below average cost (to provide lower prices for “essential” gas use and to better meet the needs of low-income customers), with the rate of the tail block above average cost to encourage conservation. Finally, a utility is at risk for not recovering its fixed costs through the tail blocks, which depends upon gas usage that is sensitive to weather and energy-conservation efforts.

**Declining-block rate:** The customer pays a lower rate for gas consumed at successively higher blocks. As an illustration, the customer would pay $5.50 per Mcf for the first 100 Mcf, and $4.50 for all consumption over 100 Mcf. This rate structure promotes the sale of gas by lowering the marginal price to larger customers from additional consumption. A utility’s earnings become more stable when the recovery of fixed costs occurs in the low usage blocks, where customers will inevitably consume at the minimum. This rate structure promotes economic efficiency when the price at higher usage blocks, within which customers use gas, corresponds to variable or marginal cost. When marginal cost does not decline with higher levels of consumption, this rate structure is discriminatory in favoring larger users. Finally, by encouraging sales, this rate structure would tend to improve system utilization (i.e., the ratio of average demand to system capacity, defined over a specific time).

**Cost rider:** A utility adjusts its rates to recover certain costs without a formal rate review. These costs could include those that deviate from some baseline (e.g., bad-debt costs that exceed the level implicit in current rates determined by a commission in the last rate case). These costs can also include zero-based expenses. A commission might allow a utility to recover all the costs, for example, it incurred in promoting energy efficiency outside of a rate case review. One justification for a cost rider is the inadequacy of using historical cost to predict future costs. A rider has the intent of stabilizing a utility’s earnings and reducing the likelihood of future rate cases. On the downside, a rider could cause
a utility to have less incentive to control its cost with the diminution of regulatory lag. Another concern is that a rider would shift risks to consumers, since supposedly the utility could more easily pass through excessive costs, or any cost increase for that matter, to consumers.

**Cost-based customer charge:** Customer costs include those costs associated with serving customers, irrespective of the amount or rate of gas usage. These costs include operating and capital costs that vary directly with the number of customers. One issue in recent rate cases is whether a utility should raise the customer charge in line with customer costs. According to cost-of-service studies, most gas utilities have customer charges set below marginal customer costs. On grounds of economic efficiency, increasing the customer charge would improve economic efficiency, since the volumetric or usage charge would consequently better reflect a utility’s variable or marginal cost. A higher customer charge would also tend to increase summer gas bills and reduce winter bills, as well as mitigate the effect of weather on customer bills. On the downside, a higher customer charge could harm low usage customers and meet with public disapproval, especially for increasing minimum summer gas bills.

**Flexible rate:** The utility is able to charge a price to certain customers within a specified range. A commission would designate a price ceiling and floor, within which a utility could charge. Short-run marginal cost might act as the price floor, and fully allocated cost (e.g., embedded accounting cost) as the price ceiling. This ratemaking practice is often the result of competitive market conditions compelling a utility to offer a rate to certain customers that fall below the standard or fully allocated cost rate. A flexible rate can help deter uneconomic bypass, where a customer switches to a competing fuel or gas provider when the economic cost of that provider is greater than the cost of local gas utility service. Flexible rates can result in value of service rates that account for the demand characteristics of customers. These rates are discriminatory in that the utility would charge different rates to customers in the same class (as long as they fall within the zone of allowable rates). Flexible rates raise the issue of who should bear the cost of discounts (i.e., revenue shortfalls from fully allocated cost revenues) – utility customers, utility shareholders, or both groups sharing the costs.

**Special contract:** The utility negotiates with a large business or industrial customer for a favorable rate and other terms and conditions. Usually the customer has service alternatives and faces unique circumstances that require a utility to offer the customer a special deal. The customer might otherwise leave the utility service area, not expand its business, or close its business. Special treatment to an individual customer constitutes a discriminatory action but one that, arguably, is justifiable under certain conditions.

**Discriminatory rate in general:** The utility charges two different prices for an identical service even though the costs are the same. More generally,
Discriminatory pricing occurs when price differences for the same service do not correspond to cost differences. Discriminatory pricing considers customers’ willingness to pay, which depends on the ability of customers to find alternative suppliers or to engage in self-supply. A utility may establish a rate, for example, based on the opportunities of an industrial customer to switch to another fuel. A utility may have to offer a rate below fully allocated costs to a particular customer or group of customers to meet the demands of competitive forces. Discriminatory pricing may help a utility to reduce its surplus capacity and improve the utilization of existing capacity by offering a lower rate to customers who would respond by increasing their usage. Discriminatory pricing raises a question of fairness, especially when a favorable rate falls outside a zone of reasonableness. When a rate falls short of a utility’s short-run marginal cost or lies above the price that an unregulated monopolist would charge, for example, a commission would likely find the rate impermissible.

**Marginal cost rate:** Favored by economists, rates that correspond to the change in total cost from a utility providing an additional unit of service (i.e., marginal cost) should give customers proper price signals. Marginal cost pricing takes a forward-looking perspective by accounting for prospective costs rather than historical costs. The rate can stimulate usage, especially when a utility has surplus capacity. Compared to the standard two-part tariff, marginal cost pricing would move the non-variable cost portion of the revenue requirement to a fixed charge. Its drawbacks include the difficulties in estimating marginal cost (e.g., long-run marginal cost) and the adjustment in rates needed to reconcile marginal-cost revenues with a utility’s revenue requirement. The latter requirement might violate acceptable equity standards by charging higher rates to captive customers.

**Seasonal rate:** The utility charges higher rates during seasons of the year with high usage. The rationale for this price differential is that the utility incurs higher costs, both on the margin and on average, during periods of high demand. A gas utility may incur additional high-pressure distribution costs and storage costs during the winter months. The rate should result in more efficient use of gas system facilities and give customers better price signals. On the downside, a seasonal rate would cause higher winter gas bills, provoking public opposition and concerns over the aggravation of gas-service unaffordability, especially to low-income households.

**Earnings sharing:** The utility adjusts its rates periodically (e.g., annually) when its actual return on equity falls outside some specified band. If the band encompasses a 10-14 percent rate of return on equity, when the actual return is 9 percent, the utility could adjust its rates upward to increase its return to 10 percent. This mechanism helps to stabilize a utility’s rate of return without a formal rate case review. Compared to traditional ratemaking, because of the diminution of regulatory lag this mechanism may reduce the incentive of a utility to control its costs between rate cases. On the upside, earnings sharing should
reduce the frequency of future rate cases and allow adjusted rates to coincide closer to recent market developments, including those affecting a utility’s costs.

**Targeted subsidized rate:** The utility offers a price discount to advance some social objective such as universal service and service affordability to low-income households. The rate offered to achieve these objectives might fall below short-run marginal cost, resulting in a burden on either utility shareholders or non-targeted customers, or both. A preferential rate directed at low-income households, for example, may involve a straight rate discount (e.g., a 20 percent discount from the cost-of-service rate) or a percentage-of-income payment plan (PIPP) where a utility bills an eligible customer based on a specified percentage of her household income.