NERC

Impacts of DERs on the BPS

Lessons from NERC SPIDERWG

Ryan Quint, PhD, PE Senior Manager, BPS Security and Grid Transformation NARUC NASEO NASUCA Training Session June 22, 2021






NERC System Planning Impacts of Distributed Energy Resources Working Group (SPIDERWG)

Aggregate Impacts of Distribution-Connected Energy Resources





Continuing Trends in DERs




NERC-Wide Cumulative Distributed Solar PV Capacity

DER penetrations are growing. Mostly solar PV. Batteries likely to follow.




DER Growth in Context



DER penetrations are growing quickly and steadily.




DER Growth in Context



The BPS is dealing with its own challenges regarding the rapid transition toward renewables.




DER Growth in Context CAISO



Growing DERs = dropping net demand levels Lowest net demand levels during off-peak conditions Coincident with renewables Will multisector electrification outpace installation of DERs?








Source: ISO-NE

It's not just a California issue Your forecast is definitely wrong (they always are). And likely underestimated.




DER Growth in Context ISO-NE



Growing DERs are shifting peak load hour. Affects modeling and studies. Information sharing is key. Source: ISO New England



NERC Disturbance Reports and Alerts



These events all involved DER tripping caused by transmission-level fault events

NERC NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION

9 August 2019 UK Disturbance

9 August 2019 power outage report

Publication late:	3 January 2020	Contact:	Simon Wilde
		Team:	Systems and Networks
		Tel:	020 7901 1834
		Email:	August2019PowerOutage@ofgem.gov.uk

This report sets out the key findings to date, outcomes and next steps from our investigation into the power outage that occurred on 9 August.

In the report we:

- identify the circumstances and causes of the outage;
- set out our assessment of the key issues, and the outcomes of our investigation into certain licensed parties' compliance with their obligations;
- identify the lessons to be learned by the energy sector to improve the resilience of Great Britain's electricity network; and
- recommend actions to implement the lessons learned.

Overview

3.30. Our lower bound for total estimated distributed generation lost across the event is 1,300MW, and the loss could be as high as 1,500MW. There is a significant possibility that this volume is in excess of the transmission connected generation lost during the event. This underscores the changes that Great Britain's electricity system is facing and the importance of understanding the role of distributed generation in the energy mix and the control of the electricity system. Our findings on the causes of the distributed generation losses also highlight the importance of compliance with the Distribution Code, and the need to strengthen and clarify the regulatory framework for these generators to meet current and future electricity system needs.

Significant DER tripping – frequency and ROCOF protection. Not expected or well-studied previously.



IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION

IEEE Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed **Energy Resources with Associated**

Electric Power Systems Interfaces

IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 21

IEEE 1547-2018 and BPS Reliability Perspectives



Source: IEEE SA

3 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10016-5997

IEEE

LISA


Sponsored by the

Generation, and Energy Storage

Implementation of 1547-2018 is paramount.




Reliability Guideline on DER Modeling for Planning Studies



- Transmission planners perform studies to ensure reliability of the BPS
 - Include all models of applicable elements (and aggregate facilities)
- Being able to represent the aggregate amount of DERs in a planning study is critically important as penetrations grow.
- We have models that are able to do this.
- This guideline explains how those models work.




Reliability Guideline on DER Data Collection for Planning Studies



- Transmission planners need information and data to be able to populate those models of future penetration levels.
 - Aggregate capacity
 - Aggregated location information
 - Vintage of installation
 - Tripping possibility
 - o Sensitivity analyses
- Data flow from distribution to transmission entities – aggregate information




Requirements Flow





DER Data Flow









- Is the flow of DER information clear for your jurisdiction?
 - Is effective T-D coordination taking place to facilitate information sharing?
- Leverage guidance from across industry on DER integration successes, modeling, studies, data collection, etc.
- Planning considerations
 - Modeling aggregate DERs in transmission planning
 - Developing base case assumptions for penetration levels
 - Sensitivity analyses
 - Dispatch assumptions for DERs and aggregators
- Data sharing across regional bodies
- Are you prepared for implications of third-party DER aggregators?



Questions and Answers



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