Resolution Urging Governmental Agencies to Take Action to Coordinate Emergency Planning to Ensure the Sharing of Outage and Other Critical Information in Emergency Situations

WHEREAS, The public interest would be served by improving the flow of communications among affected entities during emergency situations; and

WHEREAS, Electric, gas, telecommunications (including wireless), and cable providers (collectively the “Service Providers”) may experience difficulties in widespread emergency situations in determining exactly where service outages have taken place; and

WHEREAS, Different Service Providers may not have the same information concerning the location and extent of service disruptions; and

WHEREAS, While protocols and processes for the flow of appropriate information and communications during emergency situations exist, recent events have shown that they must and can be improved; and

WHEREAS, The restoration efforts of all Service Providers may be enhanced by the improvement of communications, coordination and the sharing of information among such providers and with State commissions and other appropriate governmental bodies; and

WHEREAS, All entities receiving any network outage and restoration prioritization information must abide by the appropriate confidentiality provisions under which that information was submitted; and

WHEREAS, The outage information from each Service Provider could be valuable to other service providers to help them dispatch workers efficiently and effectively; and

WHEREAS, Systematic power restoration to cellular facilities and sites could benefit utility companies, their crews in the field, and providers of emergency services and consumers; and

WHEREAS, All service providers sharing infrastructure with electric utilities rely on electric utilities to conduct restoration activities first; and

WHEREAS, All service providers rely on each other to respect the integrity of each others’ infrastructure during restoration; and

WHEREAS, Specific Service Providers’ outage and restoration prioritization information may be confidential and proprietary information and should only be provided to State commissions, other governmental bodies, or another entity with appropriate confidentiality protections in place; and

WHEREAS, It is in the public interest to ensure the coordinated, efficient and effective dispatch of all service providers’ employees and contractors to restore services as quickly as possible in emergency situations; now, therefore be it
RESOLVED, That the Board of Directors of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) convened at the 2013 Winter Committee Meetings in Washington, D.C., urges that appropriate governmental bodies and Service Providers begin collaborative discussions to facilitate the sharing among electric and gas utilities, cable television providers, wireline and cellular service providers and governmental bodies of outage information, crew dispatch and engagement information and any other pertinent information in emergency situations in a manner that aids in the coordinated, efficient and effective dispatch of resources by all Service Providers to restore services and respond to emergencies, while maintaining appropriate levels of security, confidentiality and privacy protections for such information; and be it further

RESOLVED, That NARUC suggests that State regulatory commissions should encourage and request, and to the extent possible, facilitate the development of improved coordination and communication plans among and between electric, gas, telecommunications (including wireless), and cable industries during an emergency plan’s preparation phase to help ensure that tested protocols and procedures that will assist in restoration efforts during emergency situations will be in place.

Sponsored by the Committee on Telecommunications
Adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors, February 6, 2013
White Paper on Key FCC Procedural Reforms

Ex Parte Communications and the FCC’s Connect America Fund Proceeding

The powers of the national government are limited by the principle of dual sovereignty in which two governments share power under federalism, with each operating within its respective sphere of sovereignty.¹ This principle of dual sovereignty, reflected in federalism and the Tenth Amendment, prevents the States from being treated as administrative agents of the federal government, “commandeered” into federal service. Congress may entice voluntary participation by the States so long as there is no direct or indirect coercion.² The “Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate”³ in strict accordance with some prescribed federal system, and “[t]hat is true whether Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.”⁴ The FCC—a creature of Congress—in its Connect America Fund (CAF) Order⁵ usurped the States’ intrastate access charge ratemaking role and “conscript[ed] state [utility commissions] into the [FCC’s] national bureaucratic army”⁶ for the implementation and enforcement of the Order’s explicit directives, assigning to the States “a critical role implementing and enforcing intercarrier compensation reforms” that the Order directs,⁷ and requiring State review and approval of numerous amended carrier interconnection agreements necessitated by the FCC’s changes to intrastate intercarrier compensation.⁸

As the CAF informal rulemaking proceeding⁹ amply demonstrated, the culture at the FCC is one of “rulemaking by ex parte communication.” Public comments in response to a

² Id., 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
⁴ NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
⁶ NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J. concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
⁷ Order ¶ 813, slip op. at 277, 26 FCC Rcd. 17940.
⁸ Order ¶ 815, slip op. at 277-278, 26 FCC Rcd. 17940-17941.
⁹ Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support; Developing a Unified
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are often largely ignored, either because the Commission has predetermined its course of action, or because the valued input, typically from the largest, financially strongest, and most politically powerful interests, is provided in post-comment period *ex parte* communications (e.g., helpful arguments and rationales, data, calculations, tariffs, and implementing language supportive of their proposals). After the close of the notice-and-comment period, extensive, undisclosed conversations are held between FCC personnel and outside interests. The outside interests then file a proposed “plan” (mirroring the results of these discussions) to resolve the rulemaking, which is then noticed for further comment (with a short comment period), perhaps with the inclusion of other suggested proposals submitted during the comment period. To implement the previously agreed upon course of action, such


11 *See, e.g.*, in the CAF (or *USF/ICC Transformation NPRM*) proceeding, the Motion of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners for Extension of Time, Aug. 5, 2011, at 4 (“The industry has been briefing the FCC for literally months on the discussions that led to the filing of the ABC proposal. However, though apparently, quite a bit of detail of the proposals was relayed to FCC representatives, absolutely no detail was included in any of the *ex parte* notices. See, e.g., the April 27, 2011 notice of *ex parte* contacts involving Windstream, AT&T, Verizon, Frontier and Fairpoint, filed by Jonathan Banks, available online at:


12 On July 29, 2011, beyond the comment period, the US Telecom Association, on behalf of AT&T, Verizon, CenturyLink, Windstream, Frontier, FairPoint Communications, and three rural telephone trade associations, after prior verbal consultation with the FCC, advanced their “America’s Broadband Connectivity Plan” (ABC Plan). During the comment period, the State Members of the Federal-State Board on Universal Service filed their State Plan, and the Joint Rural Associations filed their RLEC Plan.


The ABC Plan contained multiple parts, including a “Consumers Benefits Paper,” a “Legal Authority White Paper,” and the summary results of a sophisticated computer model for deriving federal USF support levels and broadband deployment—the CostQuest Associates Broadband Analysis Tool (CQBAT model).
meetings intensify just before the Commission votes on the final rule, with the effect of restricting or entirely preventing adequate responses by other interested parties.\textsuperscript{13} To incorporate

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The CQBAT model was made available only on the industry consultant’s computer in Cincinnati, Ohio, for a fee, and only after signing a confidentiality agreement that severely limited the use of any results obtained. The FCC subsequently abandoned reliance on this model and sought comment on the appropriate model, but interested persons were required to respond to the model during the thirty-four-day abbreviated comment period. \textit{See} National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), WC Docket No. 10-90 \textit{et al}., Corrected \textit{Ex Parte}, September 26, 2011, and accompanying affidavit of Dr. Robert Loube: \url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021711172}; \url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021711173}; \url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021711174}; \url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021711175} (Dr. Loube Affidavit).

On October 27, 2011, the FCC adopted, with only slight modifications, most of the major points of the ABC Plan.

The time frame for interested persons to assess, procure expert analysis, and even to access the proposed computer model for determining the level of federal USF support was grossly inadequate. Moreover, the FCC requested comments on the three enormously complex proposals without ever stating that one, or some combination thereof, would encompass its final rules.

\textsuperscript{13} On September 28, 2011, the proponents of the ABC Plan apparently felt confident enough with the outcome that they filed an \textit{ex parte} discussion draft of rules to implement universal service components of the ABC Plan and informed the Commission that the Coalition “continues its work on drafting proposed rules to implement the ABC Plan’s transitional access replacement mechanism and the intercarrier compensation components of the ABC Plan.” \url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021711629}.

On October 20, 2011, Verizon disclosed its October 19, 2011 telephone conversation with the FCC General Counsel regarding the access recovery charge (ARC). \url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021716010}. The FCC materially relied on this disclosed October 19, 2011 \textit{ex parte} telephone conversation in its final \textit{Order} adopted on October 27, 2011, and provided holding companies with the freedom to allocate ARC amounts among their subsidiary ILECs operating in various States as they saw fit. \textit{Order} \textsection 910, slip op. at 326 n.1791, 26 FCC Rcd. 17990.

On October 21, 2011 (the first day of the “Sunshine” or blackout, period before the Commission’s vote), Verizon electronically submitted two \textit{ex parte} disclosures, including one of a meeting with an FCC Commissioner to “discuss the [FCC] draft universal service and intercarrier
these last minute one-sided “suggestions,” the final rule may not be released until days or weeks after the vote in order to allow FCC staff to draft the rule suitably.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{The Need to Assure Informed State Input in the Record for FCC Decisionmaking}

In discussions with the FCC commissioners prior to and during the CAF proceeding, the State Members of the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service\textsuperscript{15} requested that the issue of federal USF high-cost reform be referred for recommended decision because of the major changes suggested by, \textit{inter alia}, the National Broadband Plan, but the Commission did not do so. Also, suggested major revisions to the universal service concept, including support for compensation reform order now circulating, as well as America’s Broadband Connectivity Plan submitted by a coalition of companies including Verizon.” (Emphasis added.)

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021717159} (discussing FCC elimination of “legacy ‘eligible telecommunications carrier’ universal service obligations for voice services when the [FCC] eliminates high-cost support to particular carriers,” or State regulated carrier of last resort or COLR obligations);

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021717208} (“In particular we discussed potential application of... sections 251 and 252 of the Act under the [ICC] system contemplated by the draft order now circulating” and “the potential role of both the FCC and state commissions, the jurisdiction of traffic (including VoIP traffic)... We also discussed the need for default intercarrier compensation rates that apply on a uniform basis across states.”).

AT&T alone made five \textit{ex parte} submissions dated October 21, 2011, on vital issues that were reflected in the final \textit{Order}, including intercarrier compensation (ICC), quantitative analysis of high-cost support through the federal USF mechanism, the upper limit for the federal subscriber line charge (SLC), and potential Commission-prescribed obligations for eligible telecommunications carriers (ETCs).

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021716987} (October 20, 2011, AT&T meeting with Office of FCC Commissioner Robert McDowell — “We urged the [FCC] to reform the federal obligations associated with [ETCs] to ensure that ETC obligations exist only in areas and for entities that receive funding from the [USF]”);

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021717080} (October 20, 2011, AT&T meeting with Office of FCC Commissioner Michael Copps);

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021716864} (October 20, 2011, AT&T meeting with Office of FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn);

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021716846} (October 19, 2011, AT&T and other ABC Plan coalition members meeting with FCC Wireline Competition Bureau and Office of General Counsel Staff — distribution of interim $300 million CAF support, use of regression analysis for this purpose for price cap carriers, accompanying regression analysis statistical results table);

\url{http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021716814} (October 19, 2011, AT&T and other ABC Plan coalition members telephone conference with FCC Wireline Competition Bureau and Office of General Counsel Staff — “We recommended that the [FCC] treat residential and business lines the same for purposes of allocating revenues rebalanced from access charges to end user charges, and we urged the [FCC] to set an upper limit of $11 on subscriber line charges”).

\textsuperscript{14} The Commission voted only six days after the Sunshine Period began, but its staff continued to draft the 751-page \textit{Order} for another twenty-two days, ample time to take into account the last minute suggestions made by Verizon and AT&T.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{See} 47 U.S.C. § 254(a).
broadband-capable networks, were not referred for a recommendation of the Joint Board. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(c)(1)(C) & 254(c)(2). The CAF Order also changed the FCC’s Part 36 rules without complying with 47 U.S.C. § 410(c)’s mandate for a specific referral to the Separations Joint Board and a recommended decision as a basis for such change.\textsuperscript{16} Referrals for State commissioner and consumer advocate input even where not required,\textsuperscript{17} are prudent prerequisites to FCC action.

\textit{The Corrosive Effect on Fairness of Undisclosed, Inadequately Disclosed, and 11th Hour Disclosed Ex Parte Communications}

As noted by former FCC Commissioner Glen O. Robinson, “\textit{Ex parte} contacts are an old problem for the FCC.”\textsuperscript{18} The FCC’s long history of “backdoor” rulemaking has prompted

\textsuperscript{16} Part 36 of the FCC’s rules (47 C.F.R. §36.1 \textit{et seq.}) implements the requirement that a carrier’s revenues and costs must be split between State and federal jurisdictions. The Order, at Appendix A (pp. 495-499), revises Part 36 rules that impact intrastate revenue requirements without a referral to the Separations Joint Board on the changes and a recommended decision mandated by 47 U.S.C. §410(c).

\textsuperscript{17} Communications Act § 410(a) provides generally for discretionary (“may”) FCC-institution of a “joint board” and referral of “any matter arising in the administration of this Act” to the joint board. Section 410(c) provides for mandatory (“shall”) referral “regarding the jurisdictional separation of common carrier property and expenses between interstate and intrastate operations” and discretionary (“may”) referral of “any other matter, relating to common carrier communications of joint Federal-State concern, to a Federal-State Joint Board.” Section 254(a)(1) requires the FCC to “institute and refer to a Federal-State Joint Board [on Universal Service] “a proceeding to recommend changes to any of its regulations in order to implement sections 214(e) [relating to provision of universal service] of this title and this section, including the definition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms.” See \textit{Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC}, 265 F.3d 313, 328 n.7 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The statute requires consultation with the Joint Board for only the initial implementation of § 254’s universal service requirement. Any consultation afterwards is permissive.” (citation omitted)). Finally, § 254(c)(1) recognizes that “[u]niversal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section,” and provides criteria for “[t]he Joint Board in recommending, and the Commission in establishing, the definition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms.” Apparently without the need for a referral, the Universal Service Joint Board “may, from time to time, recommend to the Commission modifications in the definition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms.” 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(2).

\textsuperscript{18} Glen O. Robinson, \textit{The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs}, 64 Va. L. Rev. 169, 224 (1978). The federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines an \textit{ex parte} communication as “an oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is not given.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(14).

Former FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley tactfully described the substance of these \textit{ex parte} contacts: “Compromises, fall-back positions, and the so-called ‘real facts’ are often reserved for supplemental filings, and perhaps subsequent visits to Commission offices.” Speech by FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley to the Federal Communications Bar Association (April 30, 1974), FCC Mimeo 21343 (April 30, 1974) at 4, \textit{reprinted in part in Hearings on the Open Communications Act of 1975, S.1289, before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} Sess. at 100 (1976).}
substantial federal appellate court criticism. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, in *Home Box Office* (while leveling harsh criticism for the FCC’s improper use of *ex parte* communications), correctly recognized that “informal contacts between agencies and the public are the ‘bread and butter’ of the process of administration and are completely appropriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review or raise serious concerns of fairness.”

The FCC has responded to its critics, not with tighter controls, but with more disclosure. It now posts required written descriptions of “permit but disclose” *ex parte* contacts on its website. Although salutary, these postings are often opaque and cannot possibly record every significant utterance or intended meaning, telling body language, or implicit understandings. And, of course, the meeting summaries posted on the FCC’s website are prepared by the maker(s) of the communication, not by its receiver(s). Moreover, the FCC’s disclosure rules are limited to “in-bound” *ex parte* communications from industry or the public but not “out-bound” communications from the FCC to industry or the public.

The FCC’s requirement that post-communication summaries be filed and posted on its website reflects the recommendations of several commentators for “docketing,” “placing in a public file,” “logging,” or “recording” such communications, but such public disclosure requirements alone have proven woefully inadequate, as the recent CAF *Order* rulemaking demonstrates.

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19 See, e.g., *Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC*, 261 F.2d 55, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (secret attempts to influence FCC vitiate licensing proceeding); *Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States*, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (finding *ex parte* contacts in an FCC rulemaking to assign television channels violated “basic fairness, [which] requires such a proceeding to be carried on in the open,” and ordering the proceeding reopened); *Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC*, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reaffirming and extending the doctrine of *Sangamon Valley*, id. at 51-59, while holding that the secrecy of *ex parte* industry contacts was inconsistent with “fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process” and with the idea of reasoned decision making on the merits which undergirds all of our administrative law, id. at 56).

20 *Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC*, 567 F.2d at 57 (emphasis added).

21 47 C.F.R. § 1.1200 et seq. See [http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=07461177b1b4ef32391acbb1bcfa81c0&ty=HTML&h=L&n=47y1.0.1.1.2.8&r=SUBPART](http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=07461177b1b4ef32391acbb1bcfa81c0&ty=HTML&h=L&n=47y1.0.1.1.2.8&r=SUBPART).

22 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b)(1)&(2) (relating to disclosure requirements applicable to oral presentations and written and oral presentations).

23 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a) (providing that *ex parte* presentations are permissible in certain proceedings, including informal rulemakings under APA § 553, but must be disclosed in the manner provided in § 1.1206(b)).

24 See [http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/](http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/) (the FCC’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS)).
Section 553(c) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), provides that “[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.” Public participation “improves the quality of agency rulemaking by exposing regulations to diverse public comment, ensures fairness to affected parties, and provides a well-developed record that enhances the quality of judicial review.”

As former FCC Commissioner Robinson observed, “when interested persons – without providing notice to others – are able to present their facts and arguments to individual agency members and staff, the rulemaking process imposes no check on the reliability of information presented to the decisionmakers. … Allowing unfettered ex parte communications also undermines the incentive for interested persons to submit carefully prepared studies and briefs because their work is lost so easily in the shuffle of off-the-record encounters….even the most careful written commentary of one party may be negated by the offhand, ex parte criticism of another.”

Two things are clear. First, as noted by former FCC Chairman Richard Wiley, if interested persons know that they can present their cases in private to agency decisionmakers, following the comment period, they are unlikely to disclose their positions fully in the public proceeding. Second, fairness is fatally compromised when even the most careful rulemaking written comments of one party may be negated by one-sided proposals advanced privately without fear of contrary argument, or submitted so close to or on the beginning of the Sunshine Period as to be incontestable.

In the past, the FCC has defended its lack of accountability on the ground that a rule is legitimate as long as it can be defended on the basis of publicly available information, even though the public is unable to determine the rationality of a rule in light of all of the significant

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26 Robinson, supra note 18, at 229. The court in Home Box Office went even further: “If actual positions were not revealed in public comments, …and, further, if the Commission relied on these apparently more candid private discussions in framing the final … rules, then the elaborate public discussion in these dockets has been reduced to a sham.” Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 53-54.

27 Wiley, supra note 18.

28 The period “from the release of a public notice that a matter has been placed on the Sunshine Agenda until the Commission: [releases the text of a decision or order on the matter or issues a public notice removing the item from the Sunshine Agenda or announcing that the matter has been returned to staff for further consideration]” during which all presentations to decisionmakers concerning matters listed on a Sunshine Agenda, whether ex parte or not, are prohibited. 47 C.F.R. § 1.1203. See also 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b)(2)(iii)&(iv) (relating to filing dates for presentations outside the Sunshine period and on the day that the Sunshine notice is released).
data and arguments that the FCC took into account.\textsuperscript{29} The FCC’s failure to fully disclose the sum and substance of oral \textit{ex parte} communications creates a situation at odds with the widespread demand for open government, specifically the public’s desire for a complete picture of agency lobbying (especially by regulated entities), thereby providing a perspective on the legitimacy of the agency’s action.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29} See Sidney A. Shapiro, \textit{Two Cheers for HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record}, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 853, 867 (2002).

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id.}