



National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

Capacity Allocation

Hon. Mark Vannoy, Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission March 26, 2014

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Importance and Purpose

- Transmission and Generation are pieces of an overall system
- Economic optimization of the "machine" depends upon market price formation
- The price formation signals must be visible, transparent, and non-discriminatory
- Inherent in the discussion of capacity allocation are views of keeping low cost generation export constrained by congestion in order to depress local pricing





Approaches to Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management

Contract Path Model – physical transmission rights (PTR)

Point to Point Model – implicit flows with financial transmission rights (FTR)

Maine is a part of the Independent System Operator of New England's operational area which utilizes a point to point model with implicit flows





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Point to Point Model

- How does the point to point model work?
 - Rides on a robust wholesale energy market
 - Transmission allocation is implicit to generator dispatch
 - Locational Marginal Prices
 - Financial Transmission Rights market





Locational Marginal Prices

LMP = Cost of Generation + Congestion + Losses


- Losses this is the line loss that occurs when you move power from one location to another over the transmission system
- Congestion any condition that occurs when insufficient transmission capacity is available to support delivery of the least cost resources to serve load







Locational Marginal Price










Locational Marginal Price







Congestion on the Transmission System

- Physically it occurs when a transmission system element is at its design limit
- Implications of Congestion
 - The next MW to serve an area must come from a different generator over a different path
 - In the Maine context Maine could be served by a \$40/Mwh generator but due to export constraints the rest of the system needs to dispatch a \$52/Mwh
 - In ISO this difference is considered congestion revenue and is used to pay FTR (Financial Transmission Rights) holders





Financial Transmission Rights

- A FTR is a financial instrument that may be purchased to insulate against congestion costs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market
- It does not represent a right for physical delivery of power
- The holder is entitled to receive compensation (charge/credit) for congestion costs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market
- ISO NE administers an auction of FTRs







Contract Path Model

- Contract Path Model physical transmission rights (PTR)
- This is the method envisioned in EC 1228/2003 and EC 714/2009
- The EC documents highlight the need for a market based scheme as opposed to an administrative scheme
- The market based process can be either implicit or explicit in allocating capacity







Contract Path Model

- Contract Path Model physical transmission rights (PTR)
 - A PTR is a carve out of transmission capacity on a specific contract path
 - Typically it has time horizons associated with it yearly/monthly/daily
 - Often times it is tradable in a secondary market







Implicit and Explicit Auctions

- Implicit Auction
 - Underlying idea is that both capacity and energy are auctioned simultaneously
 - The market participant buys/sells energy on a market trading platform – the market operator and the transmission system operator would implicitly ensure that grid capacity is adequate to deliver the energy
- Explicit Auction
 - The Transmission System Operator holds an auction for simply Physical Transmission Rights
 - The market participant than uses the PTR to move energy







PTR Auctions

- Both implicit and explicit PTR auctions have been functioning in Europe for the allocation of capacity
- This physical contract path model of PTR auctions has worked well where the physical connections are radial in nature
- Significant complexity is added if you have looped flows or mesh networks. It becomes very difficult to provide tracking and accounting of actual flow paths.







Points for Discussion

- 1. Section 3 item 10: Reallocation of unused capacity? How is this accomplished?
 - Use of allocation auction followed by a nomination process?
 - What is the timing typically associated with market participants making decisions on the use of transmission capacity?
 - In Maine's context this reallocation occurs in the day ahead and during the operational day (natural gas market nomination process)
 - Resale of capacity on the secondary market appears to require approval from the market regulator – Maine practice does not require transaction approval simply notification to the market monitor.







Points for Discussion

2. Section 3 item 19: Underlying regulatory principle of relieving congestion where economically justified...how does this tie back to the transmission planning process?







Points for Discussion

3. Section 5 Auctions: How do you address questions of participants financial security, provisions for confidentiality during the auction/bid process, provisions to protect against market power?







Points for Discussion

4. Section 5 item 46: Appears to be a descending auction with a uniform clearing price.

-Is there regulatory consistency with the Ukraine on cross border transmission allocation?







Points for Discussion

5. Section 8: Is there a means for cross-border transmission planning?







Points for Discussion

7. It appears that the preamble to EC 714/2009 repeals EC 1128/2003. If so there are some additional requirements to mirror the regulatory document to the new EC standard.